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This thesis examines the Federal Government's decision
to shift from almost total reliance on Government Specifi-
cations and Standards to a greater reliance on commercial
off-the-shelf products and commercial specifications and
standards. The policy is analyzed from a Department of
Defense perspective, with special emphasis placed upon the
impact that the policy will have on competition, pricing,
quality and the small business community. The conclusion
is that the "Buy Commercial" policy will have a positive
effect on competition and prLcing without sacrificing any
of the essentials of quality. The effects on the small
business community overall will be positive, in that more
small firms will be encouraged to compete for Government
contracts. For those small businesses however, that are
heavily involved in producing products to meet Government
specifications and standards the policy may spell financial
disaster unless the Federal Government renders special con-
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I. INTRODUCTION
During fiscal year 19 78 it is estimated that the U.S.
Government expended $15 8.4 billion in the private sector
for goods and services / 1_/. In numerous instances, the
U.S. Government is the largest single customer of a partic-
ular industry or firm. Because of the volume of business
done in the commercial market place, Federal Government ac-
quisition policies can and do have a tremendous impact on
the business community. In recent years, the Government
and especially the Department of Defense (DOD) has drawn
severe criticism from various private sources for being an
unwise buyer. The extensive press coverage usually given
to cost overruns on major system acquisitions contribute to
the growing public skepticism in the area of Government ac-
quisition policy. In addition to criticism from the private
sector, the General Accounting Office has conducted several
studies in the areas of ineffective acquisition policies
and strategies and made highly critical reports to the
Congress. This constant barrage of criticism from various
sectors of the society has tended to heighten the concern
of the Congress and those individuals that authorize and
are responsible for acquisition policies and expenditures.
Within the past ten years, commissions and study groups
have also criticized Government acquisition policy for
being archaic and burdensome in dealing with the private
sector. The recurring theme in all of this criticism seems

to be that the present methods of acquiring goods and
services are not the most cost effective, both in terms of
prices paid for products and administrative costs incurred
for managing associated inventories at stock points.
One of the recommended solutions that emerged from a
number of the major studies was the "Buy Commercial" con-
cept. This term is somewhat of a misnomer, since the
Government has always relied on the commercial market place
for the majority of its goods and services. Within the
context of the studies that recommended it however, this
term refers to the notion of the Government relying less on
Government specifications and standards, and relying more
on commercial specifications and standards when acquiring
products in the commercial market place. Perhaps the most
notable and comprehensive of all the studies making this
recommendation was conducted by the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement during 19 71 and 19 7 2 / 2_/. This study
group, commissioned by Congress, was the first of several
to conclude that the Federal Government should acquire
more commercial off-the-shelf products in an effort to re-
duce acquisition costs and as a means of increasing compe-
tition for Government contracts. The Commission indicated
that the elimination of detailed Government specifications
and standards from the acquisition process would ultimately
lead to the Government obtaining an adequate product at a
lower cost.

In order to implement the recommendation of the Commis-
sion on Government. Procurement in reference to buying more
commercial products, it was necessary for the Government to
change existing acquisition regulations. Defense Acquisi-
tion Regulations (formerly Armed Services Procurement Regu-
lations) explicitly stated that Federal or military
specifications would be developed and utilized to procure
products in the private sector for repeated acquisitions
where the dollar value exceeded $10,000 /l: 1-120_27. The
"Buy Commercial" concept reverses this policy by requiring
the Government to utilize commercial products and distribu-
tion channels whenever possible.
Various private interest groups and Government agencies
have a special interest in the "Buy Commercial" policy.
Two of these major groups are: (1) The Department of De-
fense and (2) that portion of the small business community
which have done or are currently doing business with the
Government. The programs and positions of these two groups
will be the focus of this thesis. The Department of De-
fense was chosen as a representative Government agency,
because it expended approximately 6 7% of the Federal Govern-
ment's acquisition budget during Fiscal Years 19 74 through
1978 /T: 4 85_7. DOD also has an unusually large volume of
military specifications and standards (in excess of 40,000),
which it routinely utilizes as a vehicle for acquiring
various products and services. The manner in which DOD
expends its acquisition funds is subject to intensive
10

scrutiny by outside sources and has received significant
publicity in recent years. The small business community
on the other hand represents a myriad of separate entities
locked in a competitive struggle for survival among them-
selves as well as with large businesses. Low profit mar-
gins and lack of significant reserves of operating capital
make these firms particularly susceptible to major shifts
in Federal Government acquisition policy.
It is obvious that the Government must seek to utilize
scarce acquisition funds in the most efficient manner pos-
sible. Although the "Buy Commercial" policy has the poten-
tial to contribute to that objective, it also has the
potential to generate unexpected side effects within that
segment of the American business community which does
business with the Government on a regular basis.
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
On 24 May 19 76, the Office of Federal Procurement
-Policy (OFPP) issued a memorandum establishing an official
Federal Government "Buy Commercial" policy /~4_7. This
memorandum was addressed to the Secretary of Defense, the
Administrator of Veterans Affairs and the General Services
Administration. It expressed the concern of OFPP toward
the trend of Government agencies to acquire ever increasing
amounts of commercial products utilizing Government specifi-
cations. In an attempt to curtail that trend, the following
policy statement was made in that memorandum:
11

The Government will purchase commercial, off-the-shelf
products when such products will adequately serve the
Government's requirements, provided such products have
an established commercial market acceptability. The
Government will utilize commercial distribution chan-
nels in supplying commercial products to its users.
/ 4:1_7
This policy statement was subsequently utilized as the
basis for development of a "3uy Commercial" pilot program
within DOD known as the Commercial Commodity Acquisition
Program (CCAP)
.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy hypothesized
that the "Buy Commercial" policy would benefit the Federal
Government in terms of lower prices and increased competi-
tion among sellers. There was also an underlying assump-
tion that the policy would be of benefit to the small
business community overall, in that it would expand the
Government market to small* businesses that heretofore had
been reluctant to enter, because of overly restrictive
specifications and product requirements. The basic research
question of this thesis therefore is:
1. Will the small business community, as a whole,
benefit from the Government's shift in acquisition policy
from the use of Government specifications and standards
to the "Buy Commercial" concept? Corollary to this basic
research question are such questions as:
2. If a negative effect will result, what are the
characteristics of such an effect?
3. What modifications to the current "Buy Commercial"
policy could be made in order to enhance accomplishment
12

of the policy's objectives relative to the small business
coininunity and the Federal Government.
B. METHODOLOGY
1. Government Directives and Dociiments
The primary policy document reviewed was the OFPP
Memorandum of 24 May 19 76. During the course of this re-
search, DOD was in the process of publishing directives
which would provide detailed operating instructions to
subordinate activities. All temporary directives and
associated operating instructions were reviewed, along with
essential correspondence transmitted between participating
activities.
2. Current Literature
Due to the widespread interest in the "Buy Commer-
cial" policy, several articles written by Government
officials and private individuals were available in jour-
nals and periodicals. These articles were reviewed exten-
sively for applicability to this thesis.
3
.
Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program (CCA?)
Milestone and Status Recorts
The Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program is an
experimental program conducted by the Defense Logistics
Agency for the purpose of determining the most feasible
strategies of acquiring products from the private sector.
The Defense Supply Centers participating in this study
made milestone reports to the Defense Logistics Agency.
These files were reviewed extensively by the researcher
13

because they provided an up-to-date account of the contracts
which had already been awarded under CCAP as well as those
awards that were being contemplated for the future. x\l-
though, in several instances, the results were incomplete,
these files nevertheless proved to be an invaluable data
source for determining the present status of the program
along with any ensuing problems or success.
4. Bidder's List of Firms Solicited to Bid on CCAP
Contracts
These lists were reviewed and utilized as the popu-
lation from which a small business sample was selected to
participate in a questionnaire. It was reasoned that
limiting the population to companies which had been solic-
ited to participate in CCAP would enhance the credence of
the responses. It was assumed that those companies would
have a better perspective on any potential effects of the
"Buy Commercial" policy upon small firms.
5 . Interviews and Questionnaire
a. Interviews
In order to get a true understanding of the im-
pact of the "Buy Commercial" program it was necessary to
cull the opinions of key Government officials involved in
implementing the program. Phone interviews were conducted
with several of the key individuals involved with the
program within the Department of Defense, the Small Busi-
ness Administration and the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy. Due to time and monetary constraints, face-to-face
14
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interviews were not conducted,
b. Questionnaire
A nineteen question questionnaire (Appendix A)
was prepared and forwarded to 150 small businesses selected
from the bidder solicitation lists discussed previously.
The major industries represented by the firms solicited
were: (1) textiles, (2) chemicals, (3) machinery and (4)
electrical products. The purpose of the questionnaire was
to determine the small businessman's opinion of the poten-
tial impact of the Government's "Buy Commercial" policy on
the small business community. It was reasoned that this
method would either support or deny the Government's under-
lying assumption that the small business community would
benefit from the policy.
C. . ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
1. Abbreviations
ASPR - Armed Ser^/ices Procurement Regulations
(superseded by DAR)
CCAP - Commercial Commodity Acquisition Program
COGP - Commission on Government Procurement
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
GSA - General Services Administration
OFPP - Office of Federal Procurement Policy
0MB - Office of Management and Budget
SBA - Small Business Administration




a. Commercial Off-The-Shelf Products
Commercially developed products sold in substan-
tial quantities to the general public and/or industry at
established catalog or market prices.
b. Specifications
A document that clearly and accurately describes
the essential and technical requirements for items, materials
or services, and that includes the procedures by which a de-
termination can be made that the requirements have been met.
c. Commercial Specification
A document used to describe a product, or a
family of products, or a process used by a broad section of
the public and industry. These documents are generally de-
veloped by non-Governmental bodies such as nationally
recognized industry associations and professional technical
societies.
d. Government Specification
A Federal, Military or departmental document
used to describe the design and/or the performance of a
product. Government specifications for items and materials
may also contain preservation, packing and marking require-
ments. A Government specification may be used alone as an
acquisition document.
e. Standards
Establishes engineering and technical limita-
tions and applications for items, materials, processes.
16

methods, designs and engineering practices. Standards are
used primarily to achieve uniformity in materials or products
and, unlike specifications, are not normally used alone as
acquisition documents.
D. SCOPE
This thesis must necessarily restrict itself to limited
aspects of the "Buy Commercial" policy. It is recognized
that there may be other ramifications of this policy which
are of greater or lesser importance than the issues ad-
dressed in this researcxh effort. A cursory treatment will
be made of some of these other issues in an attempt to en-
lighten the reader of their existence. This thesis does
not profess to project the views of the total small business
community, but the opinions expressed herein undoubtedly are
shared by certain elements of that community. The views of
the Federal Government and specifically those of DOD are
representative however, since they were gleaned from exist-
ing policy statements and confirmed by telephone interviews
with high level Federal officials.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis examines a potential major change in Federal
Government acquisition policy and its effect upon selected
entities of the small business community. Chapter II de-
scribes the background implementation, and current status
of the "Buy Commercial" policy along with the associated
programs and legislation pending as of the date of this
17

writing. Chapter III is a presentation and analysis of the
data collected in the small business questionnaire. Chapter
IV completes the study by presenting conclusions drawn from
the research, reviewing the research questions and making
recommendations concerning the "Buy Commercial" policy as it
relates to small business.
IS

II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
This chapter provides the reader background information
regarding the basic acts, laws, and decisions that have had
an impact on the Government's decision to implement the
"Buy Commercial" program.
A. THE ROLE OF G0VERNJ4ENT SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS IN
FEDERAL ACQUISITION POLICY
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
19 49 gave the General Services Administration (GSA) the
responsibility to establish and maintain a Federal-supply
catalog system. It also gave GSA the authority to prepare
and administer Federal specifications and standards for
other agencies. As of 19 77, approximately 4550 specifica-
tions and 1550 standards were cataloged by GSA /~"5 : 1_/
.
The Defense Cataloging and Standardization Act of 195 2
implemented the concept of standardizing items by utilizing
specifications and standards wherever possible within DOD.
As a result of this act and other factors, the volume of
military specifications and standards grew at a rapid rate
between 19 5 2 and 19 72. This rapid proliferation of stand-
ardization documents can be partially attributed to the
needs of the militaiy services to establish 'uniformity
among similar products. The proponents of Government
specifications and standards postulated that standardization
would enhance maintenance capability at the military field
19

activity level, reduce the necessity for extensive cross
training of maintenance personnel and reduce equipment
downtime. From a logistics standpoint, standardization
eased the burden of cataloging and cross referencing parts
and components. Standardization also facilitated full im-
plementation of an advertised procurement strategy. By
utilizing specifications and standards which had been pre-
viously tested and proven, the Government found it easier to
prepare non-ambigious bid-solicitation documents. Prospec-
tive bidders could simply refer to the specification or
standard quoted in the solicitation document and determine
the exact nature of the product desired by the Government.
This technique contributed to the aura of fairness and
impartiality which the Government desired to project as an
intimate part of its acquisition strategy. This technique
also simplified the task of writing purchase descriptions
in that less controversy was raised by bidders over the
nature of the product the Government desired to acquire.
Selection of the responsible and responsive bidder with the
lowest bid became the primary contract award criteria.
The marriage between standardization documents and
advertised procurements was consummated with the implementa-
tion of regulations which required the development and use
of military specifications and standards wherever repeated
acquisitions of an item were to be made / 2 : 1-120 2 (a) _/.
The results attained with this strategy were predictable.
By 19 72, DOD had issued some 31876 standardization documents
20

(including specifications, standards, and handbooks) /'~2 : 19_7
The Commission on Government Procurement reported in late
19 72 the following problems associated with Federal specifi-
cations and standards:
1. Obsolescence
Several specifications were of questionable value
because of their age (46% of Federal specifications were
more than four years of age in 19 72) / 2:19_/.
2. Complexity
Many Federal and military specifications referred
to other specifications. For example, the Commission found
some 313 specifications pertained to a single light bulb
/ 2:20_/. The Commission further found that it was virtu-
ally impossible for a bidding contractor to obtain a copy
of all specifications referenced in an acquisition document.
They also found that a supplier on the average must ask
three Government offices for specifications in order to bid
responsively ; thus, new companies were at a distinct disad-
vantage when bidding on Government contracts due to a lack
of familiarity with the system.
3. Cost
The method of developing and maintaining Government
specifications and standards was very costly. In DOD alone,





It was found that use of design specifications
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prevented the Government from obtaining the benefit of
technological progress. The high cost and risks to a
company of designing a system superior to that specified
in a Government design specification tended to discourage
industry from pursuing such innovative ideas where Govern-
ment contracts were involved.
5 . Specifications Too Rigidly Interpreted
Overly strict interpretation of specifications by
Government officials tended to restrict competition for
Government contracts, in that it discouraged new companies
from bidding on contracts. It also tended to drive older
companies out of the market.
The Commission recognized that the advantages which
were present when the standardization program was imple-
mented still existed (e.g. standardization facilitated
fairness in the contract award process and it established
minimum levels of quality to be met by any seller) . The
Commission also realized however, that these advantages
were significantly outweighed by the disadvantages stated
above, and as a result they made the following recommenda-
tions /~2:21_7:
a. Development of new Government standardization
documents should be based on a cost benefit analysis.
Those that cannot measure up to the criteria should not be
developed.
b. All existing standardization documents should
be reviewed at fixed time intervals in order to determine
22

their current utility. Obsolete or irrelevant specifica-
tions should be eliminated or updated as a result of this
review.
c. Packaging requirements for military items should
be separated from other standardization activities.
d. Commercial product specifications when used
should exclude special packaging, packing and marking re-
quirements. Special packaging and marking tended to increase
costs to the Government.
Following the Commission's report, limited action
was taken by DOD to reduce the proliferation rate of new
standardization documents. For example, during the twenty-
year period between 1952 and 19 72, military specifications
and standards had grown from virtual non-existence to in
excess of 31,000. Between 19 72 and 19 77 military standard-
ization documents grew from in excess of 31,000 to in excess
of 40,000 / 5_/. Percentage-wise, the growth between 19 72
and 19 77 slowed to an average of five percent annually.
During that same period, GSA standardization documents grew
at about the same rate. There was still concern at GAO
however, that insufficient progress had been made in this
area.
Two other major studies conducted by Government
commissioned task groups also addressed the role of Govern-
ment standardization documents in the acquisition process;
these groups were: (1) the Task Force on Electronic Test




The Task Force on Electronic Test Equipment re-
ported its findings in February 1975. Several problems
involving Government specifications were reported by this
task group. The majority of the problems were similar in
nature to those expressed by the Commission on Government
Procurement. Some of the identified problems were:
a. Acquisition of electronic test equipment in
accordance with a Government specification was tantamount
to buying custom made test equipment. The Government's
method of acquiring test equipment was not only more ex-
pensive at the outset than off-the-shelf test equipment,
but it also required a higher life cycle expenditure due to
the necessity of having to buy custom built parts in order
to effect repairs
-
b. Government acquired test equipment tended to
lag the state-of-the-art in the industrial community due,
primarily, to the Government's inability to maintain up-to-
date test equipment specifications.
The significance attached to this study is based on the
fact that it confirmed for a specific group of products
what the COGP had reported four years earlier, namely that
acquiring products solely through the use of Government
specifications was a costly venture. In an effort to
correct this inequity some 2 3 total recommendations were
made. Of the 28, three specifically addressed the govern-
ment specification problem, and they were / 6:27 /:
24

a. Prior to developing new specifications for
electronic test equipment, a determination should be made
if off-the-shelf test equipment could meet the minimum re-
quirement. In those instances where Government specifica-^
tions were deemed necessary, justification could be prepared
in order to substantiate the requirement. Additionally, ex-
isting obsolete test equipment specifications were recom-
mended for elimination.
b. Changes should be made to the general military
specification MIL-T-28800 (Test Equipment for Use With
Electrical and Electronic Equipment) which is utilized as
a guide for acquiring test equipment, to ensure that it
facilitates procurement of off-the-shelf equipment.
c. Reduce the rigid application of specifications
requirements, such as those dealing with environmental re-
quirements, military parts, materials and processes.
The anticipated benefits to be derived from imple-
menting these recommendations were / 6:28_/:
a. Reduced acquisition costs ($10.5 million annual
estimated savings in reduced specification writing)
b. Shorter acquisition lead times
c. Potential for cost effective use of manufac-
turers ' repair and calibration service
d.- Increased insurance against the technical and
cost problems often associated with dependence on a single
source for specially designed equipment.
25

The second major group to study the effects of
standardization documents upon the acquisition process was
the Task Force on Specifications and Standards / '7_/ . This
task group issued an informal report in mid- 19 75 and a final
report in April 19 77. This group generally agreed with the
previous two study groups, but one deviation was made in
the findings. This group suggested that specifications
were useful and should be maintained, but rigid interpreta-
tion by Government officials and rigid compliance by con-
tractors tended to create the majority of the problems
commonly associated with Government specifications and
standards. This group did agree however, that in the future
DOD should work closer with civilian standard agencies in
an attempt to develop national specifications and standards
as opposed to military specifications and standards. It
concluded that the system as it presently existed was in-
adequately organized and managed to perform the task at
hand.
The General Accounting Office has also issued re-
ports citing the disadvantages of utilizing Government
specifications in the acquisition process. Some of the
problems pointed out in these reports were / 5:6_/:
a. High management, investment, and storage costs
associated with military stocking of common-use commercial-
type items when many of these items were available from
commercial sources.
b. Low number of bids received repeatedly for the
26

same items without revision of specifications or purchase
descriptions to increase competition.
c. Packaging specifications and standards were
repetitious, redundant or not applicable and commercial
packaging was probably suitable for most military
requirements
.
ArTned with all of these reports which pointed out
the flaws in the existing acquisition system, OFPP issued
a policy statement on 24 May 19 76, which directed the
Department of Defense, Veterans Administration and General
Services Administration to commence purchasing commercial
off-the-shelf products where available, in an effort to
reduce costs associated with maintaining their respective
logistics systems / 4_/ . In response to that policy state-
ment, DOD initiated the "Commercial Commodity Acquisition
Program" in an effort to test the viability of the policy
statement. This program is discussed in a subsequent
section of this thesis
.
The Commission in its 19 72 report and GAO in sub-
sequent reports, recommended that a cost benefit analysis
approach be adopted as a means of determining whether a
new specification should be developed / 5:13_/. In regard
to this recommendation, GAO found that historically DOD
and GSA had not performed cost/benefit analysis prior to
developing new specifications , mainly because there were
no existing regulations that required it. Instead, these
agencies relied on DAR which stated that Federal and
27

military specifications were not required for items where
the total purchase" amount was $10,00 or less. However,
in the case of repetitive procurements exceeding $10,00 0,
specifications were required as a basis for soliciting bids.
As a result, prior to 19 76 cost data was not collected by
these agencies in any form that would lend itself to a
cost/benefit analysis. During 19 75 GSA's Federal Supply
Service (FSS) developed a cost/benefit criteria for specifi-
cation development, and for the first time, cost data was
available for analytical purposes. Based on data obtained
from the FSS for fiscal year 19 76, the average cost to
develop a new specification was found to be $17,241. The
average cost to develop a purchase description was $1,127
/ 5 : 21_/ . The determination of whether a new specification
would be developed within the FSS was based on the following
criteria:
a. There must be an annual recurring demand for
the products that the new specification will cover.
b. The annual demand value must exceed the specifi-
cation development cost by a 10 to 1 ratio, where develop*-
ment cost is computed as follows:
Productive No. hours required
Development Cost = Staff Hourly X to develop the
Rate specification
Productive Staff hourly rate was a semi-fixed labor cost
($30.00 at the time), which did not include laboratory
costs. This rate was to remain fixed over the budget year,
but was subject to change annually as labor rates changed.
28

The variable component of the development equation was the
number of hours required to develop or change a specifica-
tion. This basic mode was applied by the FSS to new
specification development, specification revision and pur-
chase description preparation. As an example of how this
criteria operated, during FY 19 76 FSS estimated that fifty-
six new specifications would be developed and 13,0 79 staff
hours would be expended. This equates to an average of 234
staff hours expended on each specification. Utilizing the
$30.00 hourly rate for staff hours, the average cost of
developing a new specification during FY 19 76 amounted to
$7,020. Applying the criteria that annual demand value
must exceed the development cost by a 10 to 1 ratio, the
annual demand value needed to justify a new specification
would have been $70,201 or greater ($7,020 x 10) during
FY 19 76. This value obviously exceeds the $10,000 criteria
established by DAR and FAR.
DOD on the other hand developed a slightly different
approach to specification development and management than
the FSS. DOD contended that basing specification develop-
ment and revision on cost/benefit analysis was very diffi-
cult, because several of the key factors to be considered
were non-quantifiable. DOD instead elected to concentrate
on so-called "high pay-off" specification improvements, such
as the elimination of non-essential specifications, and
greater use of specifications developed and maintained by
non-Governmental bodies. The Commercial Commodity
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Acquisition Program represents one of the major vehicles by
which DOD hoped to accomplish this goal.
It appears that the era of unlimited Government
specification proliferation may be ending. Quantum in-
creases and improvements in the standardization documents
developed and maintained by non-Governmental bodies has
produced a significant overlap with those standardization
documents maintained by the Federal Government. On-going
budget constraints dictate that every ounce of inefficiency
existent in the present Government standardization program
be eliminated. Closer ties with non-Government standardiza-
tion bodies coupled with greater reliance on commercial
off-the-shelf products are all viable approaches to solving
the long existing problems associated with Governmental
specifications and standards.
B. THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS AND
STANDARDS IN FEDERAL ACQUISITION POLICY
The commercial specification and standards network has
grown in stature and capability since the early 1950 's when
the Federal Government found it ncessary to develop its own
body of specifications and standards. The Task Force on
Specifications and Standards reported that no n-Government
standard organizations had published over 26,000 voluntary
engineering specifications and standards, many in areas
related to the DOD documents. DOD has so far adopted
approximately 1200 industry standards / 7_/ . Some of the
non - Government bodies which currently maintain and develop
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specifications are: (1) American National Standards
Institute (coordinating agent for approximately 6000
national standards), (2) American Society for Testing and
Material, (3) The Underwriters Laboratory, and (4) The
Technical Association of the Pulp and Paper Industry.
In addressing the availability of non-Government speci-
fications, the Task Force on Specifications and Standards
recommended that DOD take the following steps in order to
better utilize this existing network / 7:III-7_/:
1. Establish a focal point for interface with voluntary
standards programs.
2. Develop guidelines for DOD participation in volun-
tary programs
.
3. Encourage greater participation in voluntary
national standards programs by having DOD personnel maintain
active dialogue with the technical committee structure.
4. Nominate a responsible DOD official for the board
of directors of the American National Standards Institute.
5. Encourage use of national standards in lieu of
military specification and standards when there is no
significant advantage to DOD in the development of new
documents
.
6. Educate engineers as to the use of commercially
available components and products.
The Defense Science Board Task Force on Electronic Test
Equipment and the General Accounting Office have also pointed
out the potential advantages of utilizing non-Government
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specifications and standards. Some of the major advantages
of utilizing non-Government specifications are as follows:
1. They are less expensive to the Government, in that
the need for a bureaucracy to prepare and maintain standards
is eliminated. The various DOD and GSA activities tasked
with maintaining standardization documents constitute a
sizeable budget. Any major shift toward greater utilization
of non-Government standardization documents will ultimately
lead to a reduction in the existing bureaucracy, which
should lead to a reduction in operating costs.
2. It will promote wider competition among industry for
Government contracts, by eliminating the numerous restric-
tions and conditions currently imposed by Government
specifications
.
3. It can lead to savings in Government storage and
inventory costs through greater utilization of supplier's
warehouses and the commercial distribution system. The
elimination or reduction of specification requirements for
packaging and marking for example will enhance the capabil-
ity of suppliers to directly support military field activi-
ties, thereby resulting in reduced inventories at military
stock points.
4. It will eliminate the technology lag inherent in
certain products acquired to meet Government specifications.
This is especially true in the electronic test equipment
area. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Electronic
Test Equipment indicated that the majority of total test
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equipment sales were being made to commercial customers
utilizing off-the-shelf units. The Government on the other
hand had a unique share of the test equipment market in
that it usually procured custom units, designed to a mili-
tary specification. In many instances, these custom units
were obsolete in that an improved version of the unit had
already been developed and was available to the Government.
However, since the military specification used to acquire
the test equipment had not been revised, suppliers were
required to provide the older version of the same unit in
accordance with the specification. This not only resulted
in a technology lag in Government acquired test equipment,
but it also resulted in higher acquisition costs. The
Government had basically attempted to make the market con-
form precisely to its requirements, rather than adapting to
the reality of the market place. Exacting total conformity
from suppliers in accordance with outdated specifications
inevitably creates an environment of planned obsolescence.
There are som.e disadvantages in placing total reliance
on non-Government specifications that must be recognized
however. Some of these disadvantages are:
1. Standardization problems may ultimately result from
over- reliance on non-Government specifications. When there
are several commercial items of basically equal design
available to the Government, a problem of standardization
arises that is not present when Government specifications
are used. Several slightly different commercial machines.
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for example, may be capable of performing the same task.
The Government, however, in attempting to stock and pro-
vide support for these machines, would like to minimize the
variety carried in stock. Reducing the stock variety serves
two key purposes: (1) it reduces the need for cross refer-
encing and cataloging within the stock system, and (2) it
reduces the range of spare parts needed to effect repairs
to the machine.
2. Greater reliance on commercial products and the com-
mercial distribution system will increase the vulnerability
of DOD to strikes and work stoppages by trade unions and
other work groups. By maintaining extensive inventories at
various stock points around the world, DOD currently has a
built-in buffer against these factors.
Weighing the advantages against the disadvantages how-
ever, it appears likely that DOD will place greater reliance
on commercial specifications in the future. As non-Govern-
ment standardization bodies continue to develop and become
more adept at developing extensive standardization networks
the overlap between commercial and Government specifications
will increase. As a result, it will become even less cost
effective for the DOD and other Government standardization
agencies to maintain their present systems.
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SMALL BUSINESS C0MJ^4UNITY
The small business community has existed as a recognized
entity since June 11, 19 42, when Congress created the
Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC) /~8 : 15 7- The purpose
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of the SWPC was to mobilize small business for the wartime
production effort. . This organization was successful in
diverting to small business some 60,000 contracts valued at
almost six billion dollars / 8:16_/. Perhaps the most last-
ing contribution of this organization was the fact that it
raised the consciousness of the American public and the
Government in regard to the value- of the small business
community as a viable force in the war effort. The SWPC
was dissolved following the war, but it was reins tituted
during the Korean War (31 July 19 51) in the form of the
Small Defense Plant Administration (SDPA) . The SDPA existed
for approximately two years (until 19 5 3) . During this
period, SDPA achieved a less than illustrious record, but it
did manage to keep alive the desire to establish a permanent
organization within the Federal Government designed to tap
the extensive resources within the small business community
as well as assist those businesses in taking a more competi-
tive stance within the American economy. The SDPA was
terminated on 31 July 195 3. On 30 July 195 3, the 8 3rd
Congress created the Small Business Administration (S3A)
under P.L.-16 3. From the outset, the SBA differed from its
predecessor agencies in two major areas: (1) it was created
to be a full time organization (in peace and war) and (2) it
was designed to serve all types of small businesses as
opposed to just manufacturing firms on which the SDPA had
concentrated. At the outset, the SBA was given the power to
1. iMake loans to small businesses.
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2. Enter into contracts with other Government agencies
that would be sublet to small businesses.
3. Certify to Government acquisition officials the
capacity and credit of a small business firm to undertake
a Government contract.
4. Provide technical and managerial aids to small
business.
5. Evaluate the productive facilities of small business
in relation to war and defense production.
6
.
Encourage Government contractors to let subcontracts
to small business.
7. Make recommendations to appropriate Federal agencies
to insure that an equitable and fair share of materials was
directed toward the small business community.
8. Cooperate with Government acquisition officials with
the objective of attaining complete usage of the productive
capacity of small business.
The role of SBA as envisioned by the Congress was to
(1) aid, counsel, assist and prorect the interests of small
business in order to preserve free competitive enterprise
and (2) ensure that a fair proportion of the total purchases
and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for
the Government be placed with small business enterprises.
At the outset, SBA represented some five million small
businesses. In 19 77, that number had grown to nine million.
The following statistics will provide some indication as to




Small business constitutes / 9:2 /:
45% of the Gross National Product
55% of the Labor Force
95% of all Businesses
50% of National Payroll
The Small Business Act generally states that a small
business is considered to be an independently owned and
operated firm that is not dominant -in the field of operations
in which it is bidding on Government contracts. Over the
years however, this general policy statement has evolved
into specific size guidelines. The average number of em-
ployees is the most common determinant of whether a business
is to be classified small or large. In some instances how-
ever, gross annual receipts is used as the primary determi-
nant. Table 1 below provides a summary of the size
guidelines set forth in DAR /~3 : 1-701. 1_7-
SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE DEFINITIONS OF SMALL







RANGE OF .^LAXIMUM SIZE STANDARDS
Receipts: $5 million to $12 million
annually
Employees: 500 to 1500 (average)
Receipts: SI. 5 million to $9 million
Employees: 500 to 1500 (average) or.
Receipts: $5 million in certain
categories
Employees: 500 if not manufacturing
a product
Other If manufacturing a product




Appendix B is a detailed sample of the guidelines used by
DOD acquisition officials to make small business determina-
tions. Although this method of determining size may not
appear to be very representative at first glance, research
has shown that the average number of employees is a better
indicator of size than such economic factors as net sales,
total assets or profits / 8:61_/. The Federal Government
does business with a small percentage of the nine million
plus small businesses in this country, but major changes in
acquisition policy can have a significant impact on that
portion of the small business community competing for Govern-
ment contracts- This thesis will address the latter group.
D. REVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT LITERATURE AND POLICY DOCUMENTS
The following key documents and studies played a major
role in the Federal Government's decision to place greater
reliance on commercial off-the-shelf products.
1. The Commission on Government Procurement
This study group was commissioned in November 1969
to study the existing state of acquisition policies and
procedures within the Federal Government. Study Group 13-A,
commissioned on 6 January 19 71, was assigned the task of
examining the acquisition of commercial goods and services
by the Federal Government. The study was completed in 19 72,
and recommendations were made to the Congress. The recom-
mendations of this Commission have had the most far-reaching
implications on subsequent acquisition policies. Some of
the key recommendations made by the Commission in regard
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to greater use of commercial products include / 2_7:
a. Commercial products specifications and/or
standards should be used where possible.
b. Greater use of commercial off-the-shelf
products wherever possible.
c. Development of all government standardization
documents should be justified in advance in terms of all
costs involved in their development, promulgation, and
maintenance in relation to the benefits obtained.
d. An Office of Federal Procurement Policy should
be created to administer and coordinate the Government's
procurement programs
.
Public Law 9 3-400, enacted on 30 August 19 74, established
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of
Managem.ent and Budget, and thus was achieved one of the
major recommendations of the COGP . OFPP commenced operating
on 31 December 19 74 and since that time has played a major
role in implementing the other recommendations of the COGP.
2. Defense Science Board
a. Task Force on Electronic Test Equipment
This task force was established by DOD on
October 25, 19 74 "to examine the greater use by the DOD of
privately developed, commercially available off-the-shelf
electronic test equipment, including modification thereof,
with the goal of achieving economy and reliability benefits
for the several armed services and to recommend policies
and procedures which will maximize these benefits" / 6:1 /.
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The findings of this cask force basically confirmed the
findings and recommendations of the COGP , namely that
greater use should be made of commercial specifications and
commercial off-the-shelf test equipment.
b. Task Force on Specifications and Standards
This study group tended to disagree slightly with
the general consensus of the COGP and the Task Force on
Electronic Test Equipment over the cause of the higher cost
of acquiring products utilizing Government specification.
Whereas the former had labeled the existence of Government
specifications as a problem, the latter emphasized that the
specifications were useful. However, the rigid interpreta-
tion of those specifications by Government officials and
contractors contributed significantly to the problems com-
monly associated with Government specifications. The con-
clusion was that Government specifications and standards
were necessary to the DOD acquisition process, but costs
associated with developing and maintaining them could be
reduced by /~7:V-11_7:
(1) DOD introducing flexibility, judgement and
contractual latitude and incentives in the application of
the specifications;
(2) DOD encouraging industry to feedback cases




(3) DOD applying education, motivation, public-
ity and leadership, to the development and application of
specifications and standards.
3. OFPP Policy Memorandum of 2 4 May 19 76
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy responded
to the recommendations of these major study groups by
issuing a policy memorandum to DOD, VA, and GSA directing
those agencies to place greater reliance on commercial off-
the-shelf products whenever possible / 4_/. This memorandum
set in motion the necessary stimulation required to make the
recommendations of the COGP a reality. A chairman designated
to head a "Buy Commercial" Task Group was appointed from OFPP
and tasked with the responsibility for coordinating the
efforts of the various Government agencies. This policy
statement was significant because it could lead to widespread
changes in Federal Government acquisition strategy.
4. Federal Acquisition Bill (Senate Bill S-12S4)
This bill was introduced in the 1st session of the
95th Congress on 6 April 1977. (This bill was recently
reintroduced in the 96th Congress as S-5.) According to
its sponsors (Senators Chiles and Roth) , "This bill would
consolidate and reform the 25 year old basic laws now con-
trolling Federal contracts and replace them with a modern
statute aimed at far more intense and innovative competition;
a crackdown on sole-source awards; and a severe cutback on
specifications and regulations." / 10:3-20_/ This bill
incorporates several of the recommendations made by the COGP,
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the most important being the implementation of a new acquisi-
tion statutory base.
The primary reasons given for drafting this bill
included /~10:3-1_7:
a. The laws controlling Federal purchasing have
become outdated, fragmented, and needlessly inconsistent;
b. these deficiencies have contributed to signifi-
cant inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and waste in Federal
spending;
c. the COGP found and recommended that a new con-
solidated statutory base was needed.
Those aspects of the bill related to the "Buy
Commercial" policy are discussed below:
a. Title I. Acquisition Methods and Regulatory
Guidance"
The director of OFPP will be tasked with
promulgating a single set of Federal Acquisition Regulations
within two years following passage of the bill. This is a
major step toward uniformity in the acquisition process,
since it will incorporate several aspects of the various
acquisition regulations currently published by the differ-
ent agencies. OFPP will also be responsible for reviewing
and revising these regulations as necessary; and conducting
studies to determine whether Federal agencies have been





OFPP will oversee a program to reduce agency
use of detailed product specifications. This program is
already basically underway as a result of the OFPP Memoran-
dum issued on 24 May 19 76. The intent of the Bill appears
to be in having OFPP establish a direct specification reduc-
tion program which would be followed by agency heads. Al-
though agency heads will retain the authority to develop
and utilize specifications, their performance in the area
of specification reduction will be assessed by OFPP and
reported to Congress on an annual basis.
b. Title II. Acquisition by Competitive Sealed Bids
This method will be utilized for acquisitions
costing over $10,000 where:
(1) The product or service needed can be
clearly defined. Current regulations require the develop-
ment and utilization of specifications if the product is to
be acquired on a recurring basis. Under S-126 4 however, the
utilization of functional specifications are encouraged to
the maximum extend possible. A functional specification as
defined by this Bill is;
A description of the intended use of a product required
by the Government. In such terms that it would not
prevent the Government from considering alternative
solutions to its needs or act to limit effective compe-
tition. A functional specification may include a
statement of the qualitative nature of the product re-
quired and, when necessary, may set forth those minimum
essential characteristics and standards to which such
product must conform if it is to satisfy its intended
use./ 10 : 3-2 /
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Prior to the preparation and use of a detailed product
specification in a purchase description, the prior approval
of the agency head (written justification) would be
necessary.
(2) A number of qualified suppliers are willing
to bid.
(3) Suitable products are available so as to
facilitate award of a fixed price contract to a bidder
selected.
(4) Sufficient time is available to use the
sealed bid process.
(5) The property or service to be acquired is
within the U.S.
(6) The price for the property or service has
not been established by or pursuant to law or regulations.
c. Title III. Acquisition by Competitive
Negotiation
This method will be used for acquisitions in
excess of $10,000 that have failed to meet at least one of
the criteria for competitive sealed bids. The major impli-
cation in this section of S-126 4 for the "Buy Commercial"
program is the emphasis on functional specifications. Just
as in the sealed bid process, agency heads will be required
to justify development and utilization of detailed
specifications
.
All of the previously discussed studies and documents
represent the basis for the existence of a "Buy Commercial"
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philosophy within DOD and other Government agencies. The
specific programs which have emerged as a result of this
philosophy will be discussed further in subsequent chapters
of this thesis.
E. THE COMMERCIAL COMMODITY ACQUISITION PROGRAM (CCAP)
OFPP issued its "Buy Commercial" memorandum in recogni-
tion of the fact that in order to change existing policy and
practices it would be necessary to mount a unified effort
among the three major agencies that would be most affected
(DOD, GSA and VA) . The following statement was made in
reference to this problem:
We fully recognize the size and complexity of this task,
and that a uniform approach to implementation is essen-
tial to assure a high probability of success. Therefore,
it is requested that you designate a representative to
participate with an OFPP sponsored interagency steering
group to develop implementation procedures which, ulti-
mately, will be coordinated with all concerned agencies
prior to finalization. / 4 : 3_/
DOD ' s response to this memorandum was already in progress.
During December 19 75, DOD had issued a memorandum addressing
the acquisition of commercial products within DOD / 1_/
•
This memorandum was addressed to the four service branches
and it basically underscored the need for DOD to place
greater reliance on commercial products as a means of reduc-
ing costs. The December 19 75 memorandum further established
a steering group to design and implement a "Buy Commercial"
program. In January 19 77, DOD issued a second memorandum,
which introduced a pilot program entitled "Commercial
Commodity Acquisition Program. " This program was designed
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to become the primary vehicle for coordinating the "Buy
Commercial" effort within DOD. The January 19 77 memorandum
also provided specific objectives and implementation guide-
lines and basically aligned DOD ' s program with OFPP '
s
program. In this regard, the DOD position was stated as
follows:
It is important to point out that while the subject pro-
gram is a DOD initiative, it is also totally compatible
with the policy statement on commercial product acquisi-
tion and_support, which was issued bv the OFPP on 2 4 May
19 76. / 12:1_/
Attachments to the January 19 77 DOD CCAP implementing memo-
randum included: (1) a list of products to be procured
within the program, (2) objectives of the program, and (3)
guidelines for use during the pilot program.
1. Products Acquired During the CCAP Pilot Study
Candidate products for the pilot program were ob-
tained from all four service branches and the Defense Logis-
tics Agency. These candidates included: harbor tugs for the
Army, communications equipment for the Na^/y, electronic test
equipment for the Marine Corps, tanker cargo aircraft for
the Air Force and towels for DLA / 12 : Attachment 2_/. These
items were subsequently integrated into OFPP ' s master list-




Organizational Structure of Activities Participating
in CCAP Pilot Study
The following organization chart depicts the lines
of authority and responsibility (unbroken lines), and the
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lines of information flow (broken lines) envisioned at the





















As indicated, the lines of authority reach jointly from
Congress and the Executive Branch to the OFPP . This unique
organizational relationship is based on the manner in which
OFPP was created. Although OFPP is within the 0MB, which is
in the Executive Branch, OFPP has a direct responsibility
to the Congress. On an annual basis OFPP is required to re-
port on the results of its preceding year of operations
directly to Congress. Acting in accord with this joint
authority, OFPP can legally set acquisition policy for the
other Government agencies. The roles of the key players in-
volved in the CCAP below the DOD headquarters level are
discussed below:
a. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Headquarters DLA was assigned the task of ad-
ministering, and supervising the CCAP pilot study at the
implementation level. Items to be acquired under the pilot
program were distributed between the five Defense Supply
Centers in accordance with their normal areas of acquisition
responsibility. DLA was responsible for collecting mile-
stone reports from each of the Supply Centers and trans-
mitting progress information to higher authority.
b. Service Branches
At the outset of the CCAP study, each branch of
the military service and DLA was responsible for submitting
a list of items that could be considered as candidates for
acqiiisition under CCAP. DLA collected and compiled all of
the CCAP candidates into a master listing, which was in turn
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provided to the respective Defense Supply Centers for action.
Since that time, the service branches have maintained direct
communications with DLA in regard to their respective can-
didates within the program. Some of the on-going communica-
tions which have taken place between DLA and the services
have been in the area of specification waivers. Prior to
acquiring a military specification covered item utilizing
commercial standards, DLA was required to obtain the approval
of the cognizant service. The services have also added and
deleted items from the original list. In the final phase
of the CCAP study field activities will provide feedback
information on the acceptability and quality of the products
acquired under CCAP.
c. Defense Supply Centers
The five Defense Supply Centers were given the
responsibility for actually acquiring the products involved
in the CCAP study. In carrying out this responsibility,
they have: (1) designed and implemented acquisition strat-
egy, (2) conducted pre-bid conferences, (3) solicited bids
and awarded contracts, and (4) received and issued material
acquired under the program. The five supply centers and
their general areas of product responsibility were:
(1) Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania. Responsible for acquiring industrial
type items, such as screw caps, nuts and bolts.
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(2) Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania. Responsible for acquiring textile type
products, food and medical supplies.
(3) Defense Electronic Supply Center, Dayton,
Ohio. Responsible for acquiring electronic products.
(4) Defense Construction Supply Center,
Columbus, Ohio. Responsible for acquiring construction
products
.
(5) Defense General Supply Center, Richmond,
Virginia. Responsible for acquiring general supplies such
as food service equipment and chain saws.
A coordinator was assigned at each of the supply centers to




Contractors participating in the CCAP study were
selected by the Defense Supply Centers in the usual manner
from available bidders' lists, the Thomas Register and
other normal sources of contractor information. The acquisi-
tion strategies selected by the Contracting Officers were
subject to the usual restraints, such as Small Business Set
Asides and Minority Business requirements. In certain
instances, waivers of the set aside requirement were ob-
tained in order to test the effects of totally open com-
petition upon the bidding process. Contractors were
invited to participate in pre-bid conferences and to provide
meaningful feedback as a method of aiding in evaluating the
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program. The dialogue between contractors and the Government
is expected to continue throughout the remainder of the
program.
3. Implementation of the CCAP Study
Development and implementation of CCAP can be de-
picted by the following three phases:
a. Phase I, Pre-Implementation, December 19 75 -
January 19 77
(1) "Buy Commercial" policy promulgated
(2) List of CCAP candidates generated
(3) Responsibilities delegated to activities
designated to participate in CCAP
(4) CCAP implementation timetable established
(5) Implementation instructions and objectives
promulgated ;
b. Phase II, Implementation, January 19 7 7 -
January 19 79
(1) Assignment of specific products to acquir-
ing activities
(2) Development of acquisition strategies by
acquiring activities
(3) Solicitation/award of CCAP contracts
(4) Receipt and issue of material by acquiring
activities (continues through Phase III)
(5) On-going evaluation/report of problems and
success achieved by acquiring activities. This includes
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contractor protests, faulty acquisition strategies and user
dissatisfaction (continues through Phase III)
(6) Issue directive at DOD level on Acquisition
and Distribution of Commercial Products /~20_7
c. Phase III, Post Implementation, commenced
January 19 79
(1) Obtain feedback from end-users of products
acquired under CCAP
(2) Revise "Buy Commercial" acquisition strat-
egies as necessary
(3) Continue receipt and issue of material at
acquiring activity level (commenced during Phase II)
(4) Continue an on-going evaluation/report of
problems and success achieved by acquiring activities (com-
menced during Phase II)
(5) Evaluate success/failure of program and
report to OFPP significant findings and recommendations
4 . Problems Discovered During the CCAP Study
It is difficult to evaluate the overall success or
failure of the CCAP at this point, because of the lack of
feedback information from user activities. Some trends
have emerged at the acquisition level however, that v\/arrant
further discussion. In order to evaluate the program at
that level a total of thirty-three CCAP acquisitions were
selected as a representative sample of the total population.




As CCAP passed through the three implementation
phases, some definite problems emerged at the acquisition
activity level. These problems are discussed in detail
below.
a. Brand Name or Equal Clause
This clause was utilized in eleven of the thirty-
three CCAP acquisitions studied.
-
It essentially involves
utilizing a commercially marketed product with an established
"brand name" as the basis for a purchase description. Poten-
tial bidders are usually required to submit samples of their
proposed products to the contracting activity in order that
a comparison may be made between the "brand name" product
and the offered product- Bids are subsequently accepted
from those firms whose products are certified to equal or
exceed the quality of the "brand name" product- At least
one contractor protest was submitted in conjunction with
this clause / 14_/. The basis of the protest was that the
winning contractor had offered a product that was inferior
to the "brand name" product utilized in the Invitation for
Bids and the contracting activity had failed to detect the
deviation. This would seem to indicate that contracting
activities must carefully scrutinize bid samples in order
to ensure that they measure up to the "brand name" product
described in the Invitation for Bids. Contractors submitting
inferior products must be found non- responsive and their bids
rejected if protests and problems are to be avoided in this
area. From the standpoint of the contracting activity, the
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"Brand Name or Equal" clause can be an effective strategy
only if all parties participating in the process adhere to
the established ground rules. Contractors who purposefully
submit inferior bid samples coupled with technical evaluators
who carelessly certify such samples can only serve to weaken
the process
.
b. Commercial Market Acceptability Clause
This clause was utilized in one out of the
thirty-three CCAP acquisitions studied. The Government
definition of "Commercial Market Acceptability" is as
follows
:
Established commercial market acceptability relates to
commercial products that are currently marketed in sub-
stantial quantities for the general public and/or in-
dustry. These marketed items involve commercial sales
that predominate over Government purchases. To have
become acceptable in the market place, products must
have been priced competitively and performed acceptably,
as judged by a wide range of users. / 4:Attachment 1_/
The reasoning behind utilizing this clause as a vehicle for
acquiring commercial products is based on the assumption
that the commercial marketplace will act as a filter to re-
move those companies marketing inferior products. This
filter will in turn reduce the Government's exposure to in-
ferior products. Unlike the "Brand Name or Equal" clause,
this clause is largely untested in the acquisition environ-
ment. Certain interest groups speaking on behalf of the
small business community have suggested that the "Commercial
Market Acceptability Clause" will ultimately.. work to the
detriment of small business, because of the inherent
54

difficulty small business encounters when competing with
larger companies for Government contracts. The Government's
position is that the clause will not significantly alter
the number of small businesses receiving Government con-
tracts because of the existence of the Set Aside Program and
other factors designed to keep the small business in compe-
tition. An attempt was made to measure the perceived impact
of this clause on small business in the Small Business
Questionnaire. The responses received to this questionnaire
are discussed in a separate section of this paper. In the
final analysis however, the manner in which this clause is
used resides with the contracting activities. The manner
in which it is interpreted (narrowly or broadly) will deter-
mine the effects on those companies doing business with the
Government.
c. Purchase Descriptions Developed by the Contract-
ing Activity
This method accounted for nine of the thirty-
three CCAP acquisitions studied. Although no formal
protests were submitted by participating contractors, one
contractor was concerned enough to raise a controversial
issue. This company (a small business) objected to the
Government's decision to switch from a product formerly
bought under a Military Specification to a product bought
under a commercial market standard. This company rational-
ized that the commercial product was inferior to the MIL-
SPEC product and as a result the Government would suffer a
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loss in quality by accepting the commercial product /~15 7-
Purchase Descriptions have been used for a number of years
by contracting activities to acquire products for which no
Government specification existed. The use of Purchase
Descriptions to acquire products is not a new concept and
as such, does not require extensive testing. Ambiguity can
result however, when Purchase Descriptions are too general.
As a recourse, the contracting activity has the option of
accepting feedback from potential bidders on the clarity of
the Invitation for Bids, which should result in the attain-
ment of a Purchase Description sufficiently clear as to
allow contractors to bid responsively
.
d. Commercial Specifications and Standards
Twelve of the thirty-three CCAP acquisitions
were made utilizing commercial specifications or standards.
This strategy enjoys the highest credibility among the
frequent critics of Government acquisition policy. The
Commission on Government Procurement, Defense Science
Board and the General Accounting Office have all endorsed
the increased utilization of commercial specifications as
a viable alternative to Government specifications. For
the contracting activities participating in CCAP however,
obtaining the approval of the user activity or specification
preparing activity to utilize commercial specifications
often proved to be a problem. In ten out of the thirty-
three CCAP acquisitions studied, this was a problem. As
an example, in the textile area the specification preparing
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activities tended to advance the concept of some minimum
number of launderings (usually 25) for such items as
towels, bedsheets and undergarments as a quality measure.
Attempts were made by the contracting activity to have this
requirement relaxed, but the specification preparing activi-
ties generally refused to compromise. As a result, the
product obtained was less commercial in nature than it
would have been had the laundering requirement been relaxed.
This anomaly tended to introduce bias into a pilot study
that was designed to compare acquisition of commercial
products to acquisition of products obtained utilizing
Government specifications. One specification preparing
activity did agree to relax the laundering requirement when
the "Market Acceptability" clause was utilized, which in-
dicates that the specification preparing activities are
logically concerned about maintaining product quality either
via a Government screening mechanism or a commercial screen-
ing mechanism. Therefore, contracting activities must lean
toward greater utilization of the "Market Acceptability"
clause or other commercial quality assurance techniques in
order to obtain the acquiescence of the specification pre-
paring activities on total relaxation of Governm.ent
specification requirements.
e. Potential Problems Raised by the Small Business
Administration
During the CCAP study, the Small Business Ad-
ministration raised the issue of the Federal Government's
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continued coiranitment to small business. In a letter ad-
dressed to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the
SBA made the following observation about the "Buy Commercial"
program:
This agency supports the effort to encourage implementation
of this policy when it is properly applicable and small
business interests are given full consideration in the ac-
quisition process, including the employment of set-asides
when their criteria are met. However, the repeated empha-
sis given the policy by top Government officials gives
rise to a legitimate concern that contracting officials,
zealously responding to the emphasis, might apply the pol-
icy too broadly rather than with the selectivity needed to
assure its success. Such an approach could cause them to
inadvertently overlook the Government's preferential policy
for small business and its attendant provision for setting
aside procurements for exclusive small business competi-
tion. / 15_/
SBA's concern is based primarily on the contracting officer's
interpretation and application of the "Buy Commercial"
philosophy to future acquisition. As additional emphasis of
this concern, SBA further states;
Under the proposed critera, small suppliers, whose dedica-
tion to service solely the needs of the Government has
negated any ' necessity to develop commercial counterpart
items and avenues of distribution, may be denied oppor-
tunities_ to bid on items they have ably supplied in the
past. / 16_7
The focal point of SBA's concern appears to be in the wording
of the "Market Acceptability" clause, which essentially
states that in order for a company to meet the criteria,
more than one-half of its sales must be within the private
sector. SBA is addressing the case of the small business
which has concentrated its efforts on obtaining Government
contracts over the years, and as a result is not prepared
to compete on a commercial basis. These quasi -Government

companies, and t±ie industries they represent, are unknown
primarily because no Government agency maintains data on
companies based on the percentage of business done with the
Federal Government. Therefore, it is difficult for SBA to
make a solid case for this constituency. DOD ' s response to
the general issues raised by SBA tend to reflect a macro-
perspective of the problem. The .chairman of the "Buy
Commercial" Task Group expressed DOD ' s view via a memorandum
which stated:
Total purchases from small business concerns will most
likely increase under ADCP through greater use of
commercial outlets that are predominantly small business.
However, initially there may be some adverse impact on
small business manufacturers, that are exclusively or
predominantly manufacturing products of special design,
whenever an off-the-shelf product_is available to fill
the need at a lower total cost. / 17_/
Analysis of the above statement tends to indicate that DOD
is less concerned with the constituency that the SBA ad-
dressed previously, and more concerned with reducing costs.
SBA expressed more specific concerns for small
business in a subsequent letter to the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy /18_/. In this letter four broad areas
were addressed as having a potential negative impact on
certain segments of the small business community.
(1) The Shifting from Government Specifications
to Commercial Specifications . SBA reports that certain
small businesses in the food service equipment industry are
already experiencing severe hardship as a result of the
shift from Government specifications to commercial
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specifications in that area. Large businesses with "brand
name" products are projected as the immediate benefactors,
since their products are generally well known and tested in
the commercial sector. SBA's contention is that the small
firm which has devoted all of its resources toward supplying
products in accordance with Government specifications will
be abruptly eliminated from competition because of the shift
to commercial specifications. SBA proposes a two-year
moratorium on full implementation of the "Buy Commercial"
policy as a means of alleviating the negative impact on
selected firms. During that two-year period, those firms
would have the opportunity to change their mode of operation
and hopefully become more competitive with firms marketing
products primarily to the private sector. The Small Busi-
ness Administration further proposed to provide special
assistance to those firms during the two-year adjustment
period. The question that SBA has raised in regard to shift-
ing from Government specifications to commercial specifica-
tions is essentially moral in nature. In essence, the
question can be stated as follows: Does the Federal Govern-
ment have a moral obligation to render special consideration
or treatment to those small businesses which have chosen to
remain an integral part of the Defense Industrial Base, and
if so, to what extent? This is a complex question at best,
in view of the fact that an abrupt shift to a commercial
acquisition program may provide instant positive results to
DOD in terms of increased competition and lowered acquisition
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costs. Delaying the implementation for two years on the
other hand will result in a potential sacrifice of the cost
savings which would accrue if the program were implemented
immediately. The benefit of reduced acquisition costs, and
increased competition must be weighed against the possible
cost of imposing severe hardship and possible bankruptcy on
some unknown number of small firms who rely heavily upon
the sale of products manufactured in accordance with Govern-
ment specifications.
(2) There is a lack of clarifying policy guid-
ance for field level contracting activities participating
in CCAP . This concern is based on the fact that SBA field
representatives have reported some instances where field
contracting activities requested and received permission
from the small business representative to deviate from the
Small Business Set Aside Program. This action reportedly
resulted in the Government paying higher prices for the
products and a loss of revenue to the small businesses con-
cerned. In regard to this issue, SBA's position is:
GSA and DOD need to issue a much more affirmative policy
statement to their buying centers instructing them to
continue all small business set_asides and preferences
even under the ADCP purchase. / 18_/
The Small Business Administration has expressed a valid
concern in reference to the welfare of selected segments of
the small business community. However, in the case of the
thirty-three CCAP acquisitions reviewed there was one in-
stance where the Small Business Set Aside provision was
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waived / 19 : 1_/ . In this instance the Small Business Repre-
sentative agreed to an unrestricted acquisition as a test
case. By allowing the unrestricted acquisition to occur,
the contract award was made to a large firm who bid $52,689
less than the lowest bidding small firm / 19 : 2_/ . No other
evidence was discovered which would substantiate the SBA
assertion that the Small Business Set Aside Program has been
or will be jeopardized during implementation of the "Buy
Commercial" policy. To the contrary, the "Buy Commercial"
Task Group has addressed this problem in some detail, and
issued the following policy statement:
If there are a sufficient number of small business
manufacturers marketing a "state-of-the-art" product
that satisfies the need at a reasonable price it should
be set aside. / 1'7_/
This statement would tend to indicate that DOD ' s commitment
to the Small Business Set Aside program will not change
with the implementation of the "Buy Commercial" policy.
The Set Aside program however, will warrant continual moni-
toring by both DOD and SBA during the transition phase.
( 3) DOD Utilization of the Commercial
Distribution System . The DOD policy on distribution of
commercial products as expressed in a directive is as
follows
:
Use commercial distribution channels in supplying
commercial products to users when it is economically
advantageous to do so and the imoact on military
readiness is acceptable. / 20 : 2_/
The Small Business Administration expressed concern over





In some instances, this may actually work to the advan-
tage of large manufacturers because of their distribu-
_
torships and other dispersed outlet capabilities. / 18_/
The Small Business Administration believes that the ultimate
effect of this policy will be a reduction in the small
business share of the Government market, because of their
inability to provide the Government with an extensive dis-
tribution network. No hard data is available which would
support or deny SBA's allegation. The Small Business Ad-
ministration's suggestion that a study be conducted in this
area appears to be reasonable in view of the possible impact





III. RESULTS OF THE SI^ALL BUSINESS QUESTIONNAIRE
A. BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS
The Government's implied hypothesis is that the "Buy
Commercial" program will benefit the small business commu-
nity as a whole by fostering increased competition for
Government contracts. Discussions with officials at SBA
headquarters and OFPP revealed that there was some concern
among these officials for a special category of small
businesses. These firms are characterized by the fact that
they have developed and existed almost entirely on Govern-
ment contracts for a substantial number of years. These
companies, in many instances, produce products that are
similar in nature to commercial off-the-shelf products but,
with one exception, are produced in accordance with Govern-
ment specifications. As an example, there are small busi-
nesses which produce undershirts, towels, Worches tershire
sauce and various other commodities almost exclusively for
the Government, in accordance with Government specifications
Since the majority of their sales are made to the Govern-
ment, these companies usually have an organizational struc-
ture somewhat different from that of a similar company
competing in the commercial market place. One major differ-
ence in the organizational structure of these Government-
oriented companies is the lack of a substantial commercial
marketing or distribution capability. Companies which
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concentrate primarily on obtaining Government contracts
are usually more concerned with ensuring that Government
contracting activities have a bidders' list on which the
name of their firm appears, than they are with mounting a
si:ibstantial marketing campaign. Therefore, these companies
may be very competitive in terms of bidding on and receiving
Government contracts, but they may have little or no experi-
ence competing with fijrms that market primarily in the
private sector. Recognizing that such businesses exist, an
effort was made by the researcher to determine who they were
and in what industries they existed. Because no data base
capable of yielding the desired results could be located
within the various Federal agencies, a method was developed
to collect and analyze data concerning this problem.
It was reasoned that those companies which had or were
participating in the bidding process under the CCAP acquisi-
tions would have greater firsthand knowledge of the "Buy
Commercial" program and its possible effects than any other
within the small business community. As a result, it was
assumed that the candid opinions of a sample of these firms
would provide an answer to the research question (Will the
small business community as a whole benefit from the Govern-
ment's shift in acquisition policy from the use of Government
specifications and standards to the "Buy Commercial" con-
cept?) In order to obtain a proper sample, lists of com-
panies who had been solicited to participate in the CCAP
bidding process were obtained from DPSC, Philadelphia, DGSC,
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Richmond and DISC, Philadelphia (when coinbined, tiiese
activities account" for more than one-half of all CCAP
acquisitions made to date) . The sample obtained was com-
prised primarily of firms in the clothing and textile in-
dustry, selected segments of the chemical industry and
general hardware industry. Some 150 companies were selected
to participate in the survey and questionnaires were mailed
to the potential respondents in late December 19 78.
3. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
The questionnaire was designed to elicit the opinions
of small businesses about themselves and about the small
business community as a whole, taking into consideration
the major implications of the "Buy Commercial" program.
Questions one through four were included for the purpose of
obtaining a profile of the respondents and as an aid in
stratifying the sample. The remainder of the questions re-
quired respondents to answer based on their own opinions.
Therefore, any conclusions drawn from the questionnaire must
be viewed in this light. Prior to designing the question-
naire, it was anticipated that the respondents would fall
into three major categories: (1) those firms who did no
business with the Government, (2) those firms who did less
than 50% of their business with the Government, and (3)
those firms doing more than 50% of their business with the
Government. It was hypothesized that each group might view
the "Buy Commercial" program in a different manner, based
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on the potential gains or losses they could discern within
the program for their own firms.
C. STRATIFICATION TECHNIQUE
Respondents within the sample were stratified into three
groups, based on the average percentage of annual sales
made to the Federal Government during the years 19 76, 19 77,
and 19 78. The following group designations were assigned
based on that stratification method:
1. Group A
Those small business who reported making zero sales
to the Federal Government during the three-year period.
2. Group 3
Those small businesses who reported making greater
than zero, but less than 50% of their sales to the Federal
Government during the three-year period.
3. Group C
Those 'small businesses who reported making 50% or
greater of their sales to the Federal Government during the
three-year period.
Hereafter, the respondents to the questionnaire will be
referred to by the designations assigned above.
D. RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Out of a total of 150 questionnaires mailed out, seventy
responses were returned. Twenty- three respondents drafted
letters declining to respond to the questionnaire due
primarily to a professed lack of knowledge of the "Buy
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Coiranercial" program. From the forty-seven respondents com-
pleting the questionnaire, the following distribution was
obtained:
Group A (zero sales to Government) 9
Group B (up to 50% sales to Government) 28
Group C (50% or greater sales to Government) 10
Due to the expressed research objective of maintaining re-
spondent anonymity, no attempt was made to follow-up on
those eighty firms which did not respond.
E. PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
Respondents were profiled within group designations as
an aid to performing an analysis of their respective re-
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F. ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED MPACT OF THE "BUY COMMERCIAL"
PROGRAM ON COMPETITION FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
In examining the area of competition, the objective was
to ascertain the perceived impact of the "Buy Commercial"
program on competition for Government contracts within
selected industries and the small business community as a
whole. Two questions on the questionnaire addressed this
area.
6a. The "Buy Commercial" program will result in
increased competition for Government contracts
among small business.
6b. The "Buy Commercial" program will result in
increased competition for Government contracts
in my industry.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Agree Opinion Disagree Disagree12 3 4 5
Respondents were requested to indicate the extent of their
agreement or disagreement with the above statements by
circling the appropriate number. Responses to these two
questions are contained in Table II. Overall, 77% of the
respondents agreed that competition within the small busi-
ness community for Government contracts would increase and
53% agreed that competition within their own industry would
increase if the "Buy Commercial" program were implemented.
Comparing the responses of Group C to those of Groups A and
B however, revealed a significant difference. Group A and
B firms tended to view the "Buy Commercial" program as a
stimulus for increasing competition (100% for the former
and 82% for the latter)
. Group C respondents on the other
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hand, tended to view the competition stimulus idea less
optimistically. Only 40% of Group C respondents thought
that competition for Government contracts would increase,
while 50% thought that it would not. The outlook of Group C
on increased competition within their respective industries
was even more pessimistic, approximately 60% believed that
competition would not increase in their own industry as a
result of the program.
TABLE II
6a. THE "BUY COJIMERCIAL" PROGRAM WILL RESULT IN
INCREASED CON-PETITION FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
AMONG SMALL BUSINESS.
6b. THE "BUY COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM WILL RESULT IN
INCREASED COMPETITION FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
IN MY INDUSTRY
GROUP A GROUP• B • GROUP C TOTAL PERCENT
Response 5a 6b 6a 6b 6a 6b 6a 6b 6a 6b
AGREE 9 7 23 21 4 4 36 32 77 58
DISAGREE 6 2 3 5 5 6 3 13 17 28
NO OPINION -) 2 1 3 2 6 4
TOTAL 9 9 28 23 10 10 4747 10
The foregoing two questions tended to confirm the Govern-
ment's assumption that competition for Government contracts
would increase as a result of the "Buy Commercial" program.
Some of the companies which had never before bid on Govern-
ment contracts indicated that they would do so if the "Buy
Commercial" program became a reality.
71

G. ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED EFFECT OF THE ELIMINATION OF
GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS ON PRICES AND PRODUCT QUALITY
The basic Government policy in regard to pricing is to
pay a fair and reasonable price for goods and services re-
ceived from the private sector. As previously discussed, a
number of critics have questioned whether the Government is
paying a higher than reasonable price for goods and services
because of the existence of overly detailed Government
specifications and standards. The following questions
specifically addressed the impact of Government specifica-
tions and standards on price and quality of goods obtained
from the private sector.
6c. The elimination of Government specifications will
result in the Government obtaining lower prices
under the "Buy Commercial" program.
6d. I expect that my firm will lower prices to the
Government if Government specifications are
eliminated.
6e. The quality of the products that the Government
receives will decline if Government specifications
are eliminated.
6f. The quality of the products that I supply the
Government will decline if Government specifica-
tions are eliminated.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Agree Opinion Disagree Disagree12 3 4 5
Respondents were requested to indicate the extent of their
agreement or disagreement with the above statements by
circling the appropriate number. Responses to these four
questions are contained in Tables III and IIIA.
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1. Group A Responses
Group A firms overwhelmingly agreed (89%) that the
Government would obtain lower prices overall as a result of
eliminating Government specifications. But, on the related
question (6d) of whether or not an individual firm would be
able to reduce its prices as a result of the elimination of
Government specifications the responses were evenly divided
between "agreement" and "disagreement." This would tend to
indicate that there is a great deal of uncertainty among
these firms as to the impact of Government specifications on
costs within their own operations. This is logical, in view
of the fact that Group A firms are unaccustomed to producing
products in accordance with Government specifications.
Two-thirds of this group did not believe that the Government
would receive inferior products as a result of eliminating
Government specifications. The related question (5f) was
also a major area of disagreement for these firms, 78% did
not believe that the elimination of Government specifications
would cause their own firm to supply a lower quality product.
Again, this response must be tempered by the fact that Group
A firms are presently not producing any products in accord-
ance with Government specifications and as a result, proba-
bly have less firsthand knowledge of specification quality
requirements than Groups B and C.
2. Group B Responses
Group B firms agreed (79%) that the Government would
obtain lower prices overall as a result of eliminating
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Government specifications. In responding to the related
question (6d) of whether an individual firms would lower
its own prices as a result of the elimination of Government
specifications, 54% agreed that they would. Seventy-five
percent of this group did not believe that the Government
would receive a lower quality product if specifications
were eliminated. In responding to the related question
(6f) , 93% indicated that the quality of product their firm




6c. THE ELIiMINATION OF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS WILL
RESULT IN THE GOVERNMENT OBTAINING LOWER PRICES
UNDER THE "BUY COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM.
6d. I EXPECT THAT MY FIRM WILL LOWER PRICES TO THE
GO^/ERNMENT IF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS ARE
ELIMINATED.
6e. THE QUALITY OF THE PRODUCTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT
RECEIVES WILL DECLINE IF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS
ARE ELIMINATED.
6f. THE QUALITY OF THE PRODUCTS THAT I SUPPLY THE
GOVERNMENT WILL DECLINE IF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS
ARE ELIMINATED.
GROUP A GROUP B GROUP C TOTAL PERCENT
Response 6c 6d 6c 6d 6c 6d 6c 6d 6c 6d
AGREE 8 4 22 15 7 7 37 26 79 55
DISAGREE 1 4 4 12 2 2 7 18 15 39
NO OPINION 1 2 1 1 ]_ 3 3 6 5
TOTAL 28 28 10 10 47 47 10
TABLE IIIA
GROUT A GROUP B GROUP C TOTAL PERCENT
Response 6e 6f 6e 6f 6e 6f 6e of 6e 5f
AGREE 2 1 6 1 6 5 14 7 30 15
DISAGREE 6 7 21 26 3 5 30 38 64 31
NO OPINION 1 ]_ 1 1 1 3 2 6 4





Group C firms agreed (70%) that the Government would
obtain lower prices overall by eliminating specifications.
On the related question (6d) Group C firms indicated that
they would lower their individual prices if Government spec-
ifications were eliminated. However, these firms were less
optimistic about holding the line on product quality (assum-
ing that prices were lowered) . Sixty percent indicated
that the Government would receive a lower quality product
overall, and 50% indicated that the quality of the product
that they supplied would decline if Government specifications
were eliminated. Some of the comments made by Group C firms
tended to indicate that they thought they were presently
supplying the Government with the best possible product as
manufactured to Government specifications- They perceived
a significant quality sacrifice if the Government decided
to eliminate Government specifications, price reduction
notwithstanding.
4. Overall Group Response
Overall, 79% of the respondents tended to agree
that the Government would obtain lower prices by eliminating
Government specifications. More than one-half (55%) indi-
cated that they would lower their individual prices as a
result of this policy. Only 36% believed that the overall
product quality would decline, and an even lower percentage
(15%) didn't think that their particular product would
decline in quality. With the exception of Group C
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respondents who tended to view the program with consterna-
tion, the consensus was that the Government would benefit
from reduced prices, but would not necessarily suffer a
concomitant degradation in product quality. The nature of
these responses tends to confirm the findings of the Com-
mission on Government Procurement and other groups who
previously addressed this issue, .namely that the Government
could rely to a greater extent on commercial specifications
and off-the-shelf products.
H. ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED IMPACT OF THE "MARKET ACCEPTABIL-
ITY" CLAUSE ON SMALL BUSINESS
The "Market Acceptability" clause represents a new
approach to contracting for goods and services from the
private sector. Unlike the "Brand Name or Equal" clause,
this approach is largely untested. As a result, the effects
on the small business community are basically unknown. In
order to make up for the lack of familiarity with this
clause, the cover letter accompanying the questionnaire gave
a concise definition of the clause as set forth by OFPP.
Respondents were asked to react to the following three
questions based on their own knowledge of the clause and/or
the definition contained in the cover letter.
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6i. The "Market Acceptability" clause will hurt those
small businesses whose primary customer has been
the Federal Government, since those firms have no
established place in the commercial market.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Agree Opinion Disagree Disagree12 3 4 5
10. In terms of obtaining Government contracts, do you
believe that the "Market Acceptability" clause
provides an advantage to (please circle the





Does not provide an advantage to either
11. Do you believe that the Government has an obligation
to provide special consideration or assistance to




Responses to these three questions are summarized in Tables




6i. THE "MARKET- ACCEPTABILITY" CLAUSE WILL HURT THOSE
SMALL BUSINESSES WHOSE PRIMARY CUSTOMER HAS BEEN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, SINCE THOSE FIRf4S HAVE NO
ESTABLISHED PLACE IN THE COMMERCIAL MJ^RKET.
Response GROUP A GROUP B GROUP c TOTAL PERCENT
AGREE 4 16 8 28 60
DISAGREE 3 5 ' 2 10 21
NO OPINION 2 7 9 19
TOTAL 28 10 47 100
TABLE V
10. IN TERMS OF OBTAINING GOVERNMJINT CONTRACTS, DO YOU
BELIEVE THAT THE "MARKET ACCEPTABILITY" CLAUSE
PROVIDES AN ADVANTAGE TO (PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPRO-
PRIATE RESPONSE AND COMMENT ON THE REASON FOR YOUR
RESPONSE)
.




BUSINESS 3 8 5











11. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AN OBLIGATION
TO PROVIDE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OR ASSISTANCE TO
THOSE SMALL BUSINESSES THAT MIGHT BE HURT BY THE
"MARKET ACCEPTABILITY" CLAUSE?




NO 7 17 2 26 55
TOTAL 9 28 10 47 100
1. Analysis of Group A Responses
No clear consensus emerged among this group con-
cerning the effects of the "Market Acceptability" clause
on small business. Forty-four percent agreed that the
clause would have a negative effect, but 34% thought that
it would not (Table IV) . Keeping in accord with this trend,
Group A respondents basically perceived that neither small
nor large businesses would gain by the clause (44%) , al-
though 34% thought large businesses would make gains, as
compared to only 22% who thought that small businesses
would gain (Table V) . Group A firms were less sympathetic
toward the plight of small businesses which might be hurt
by the clause. Seventy-eight percent indicated that the
Government should not render special assistance to such
companies. Analyzing some of the comments from this group,
the consensus seemed to be that those small businesses





2. Analysis of Group B Responses
Fifty-seven percent of Group B respondents agreed
that the "Market Acceptability" clause would be detrimental
to small businesses heavily involved in providing products
to the Government. On the question of which community
(large or small business) would gain an advantage however,
Group B respondents tended to believe that the status quo
would be maintained. A resounding 61% thought that the
Government should not provide special assistance to those
firms that might be hurt by the clause.
3. Analysis of Group C Responses
Group C firms differed significantly from Groups
A and B on whether they would be hurt by the "Market
Acceptability" clause. Eighty percent agreed that the
clause would have a negative impact on their business.
Consistent with this pessimistic outlook. Group A firms
viewed large businesses as gaining an advantage over small
businesses as a result of the clause (50%) , while none of
t±iem thought that small businesses would make any gains.
Predictably, 80% believed that the Government should pro-
vide some form of special assistance to those companies
hurt by the clause. Some of the specific comments made in
this regard are listed below.
Large businesses will gain an advantage because they
have a greater advertising and distribution capability.
The government should help to finance small businesses
caught in this bind, until such time that they are able
to compete with the commercial firms on an equal basis.
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The Government should rigorously enforce the Small Busi-
ness Set Aside Program, in order to ensure that it
isn't compromised by over-reactive contracting officials.
One firm gave a specific example in reference to the
clothing industry.
We believe that the "Market Acceptability" clause will
benefit big business because they have retail outlets
capable of furnishing figures demonstrating the market
acceptability of their shirts. We would have to have
sample materials knit and finished by outside concerns
(with no idea of what the Government might accept) and
submit these samples which would have no retail back-
ground and demonstrated acceptability in the commercial
market.
The majority of the comments made by Group C firms were
along this vein, although a small percentage (20%) thought
that the Government had no special obligation to these
firms, and as a result should not provide assistance beyond
what is already in existence.
4. Analysis of Overall Group Responses
Overall, the respondents agreed that those small
businesses relying most on Government contracts would be
hurt by the "Market Acceptability" clause (60% agreed with
this position). In spite of this realization however, 55%
did not believe that the Government should give special
consideration to those businesses. The consensus appeared
to be that if those firms could not adjust to the new envi-
ronment, they should be eliminated by the natural economic
process in the commercial market place.
82

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED IMPACT OF THE "BRAND NAME OR
EQUAL" CLAUSE ON SI-IALL BUSINESS
The "Brand Name or Equal" acquisition method is referred
to in DAR as follows:
The term "brand name product" means a commercial product
described by brand name and make or model number or
other appropriate nomenclature by which such product is
offered for sale to the public by the particular manu-
facturer, producer or distributor.
Brand name or equal purchase descriptions should set
forth those salient physical, function, or other charac-
teristics of the referenced products which ar£ essential
to the needs of the Government. / 3:l-1206-2_/
This clause is already being used by Government contracting
activities. Therefore, it is assumed that the respondents
were more familiar with it than the "Market Acceptability"
clause. Respondents were requested to respond to the
following question:
9. In terms of obtaining Government contracts, do you
believe that the "Brand Name or Equal" concept




The responses to the above question are summarized below:
Small business has an advantage 34%
Large business has an advantage 2 8%
Neither has an advantage 38%
In analyzing the overall responses there is not a clear-cut
consensus in either direction. It appears however, that
the respondents tended to view the clause in either a
neutral sense or as a slight edge in favor of small business

Groups A and B commented that "the small businesses would
benefit only if the Government established and maintained
a broad definition of equality between products. Narrow
interpretation of equality would tend to bias contract
award in favor of large business, since they possessed the
majority of brand name products." Group C respondents to
the contrary, tended to view large businesses as having the
advantage by a sizeable margin. Only 10% of this group saw
small business as having an advantage, whereas 60% viewed
large business as the benefactor. Group C respondents also
tended to believe that big companies marketed most of the
brand name products, and as a result, this would give them
an edge in the bidding process, notwithstanding the fact
that a small business may be capable of proving its non-
brand name product equal to the brand name product. In
comparing the outlook of the groups toward the "Brand Name
or Equal" clause with the "Market Acceptability" clause, it
appears that the latter has less credibility with the small
business respondents. Only 19% of the respondents thought
that the "Market Acceptability" clause would provide an
advantage to small business, whereas 34% thought that the
"Brand Name or Equal" clause would provide such an advan-
tage. This difference may be attributable to the lack of
familiarity the respondents have with the "Market Accepta-
bility" clause, but it may also be due to the wording of the





J. ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED OVERALL IMPACT OF THE "BUY
COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM ON SMALL BUSINESS
In order to evaluate the overall perceived impact of
the program, four specific questions were directed toward
that end. It was reasoned that the responses to these four
questions when combined with the responses to prior ques-
tions, would provide an overall outlook on the program from
the perspective of the small businessman. The following
four questions were considered relevant to this approach.
6g. Overall, the small business community will benefit
from the "Buy Commercial" program.
6h. My firm will benefit from the "Buy Commercial"
program.
Strongly No Strongly
Agree Agree Opinion Disagree Disagree
7. If the "Buy Commercial" program becomes law, what
do you perceive its impact will be on your share




8. How do you think the "Buy Commercial" program will
affect the mix of small and large businesses
currently obtaining Government contracts?
Small business will receive a larger share
Large business will receive a larger share
No Change
The responses to the above questions are summarized in




6g. OVERALL, THE SMALL BUSINESS COMMUNITY WILL BENEFIT
FROM THE "BUY COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM.
6h.. MY FIRM WILL BENEFIT FROM THE "BUY COMMERCIAL"
PROGRAM
GROUP A GROUP' B GROUP C TOTAL PERCENT
Response 6g 6h 6g 6h 6g 6h 6g 6h 6g 6h
AGREE 6 4 21 19 3' 2 30 25 64 53
DISAGREE 2 1 6 8 6 8 14 17 30 36
NO OPINION 1 4 1 1 1 3 5 6 11
TOTAL 28 10 10 47 47 100
TABLE VIII
IF TxHE "BUY COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM BECOfffiS LAW, WHAT DO
YOU PERCEIVE ITS IMPACT WILL BE ON YOUR SHARE OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACT MARKET?
THE "BUY COMMERCIAL" PROGRAM WILL CAUSE SMALL












INCREASE 3 5 13 12 1 1 17 18 36 38
DECREASE 1 7 7 6 7 13 15 28 32
NO CHANGE 6 3 8 9 3 2 17 14 36 30
TOTAL 28 28 10 10 47 47 100
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1. Analysis of Group A Responses
Sixty-seven percent of Group A respondents agreed
that the "Buy Commercial" program would benefit the small
business community, but less than one-half (44%) thought
that it would benefit their firm personally. In responding
to what the program might mean to the share of the Govern-
ment market which small businesses presently hold, 55%
thought that the small business share of the market would
increase, as compared to just 34% who thought their own
share of the market would increase. Sixty-six percent
thought that their own share of the Government market would
not change. The 34% agreement factor is significant, in
view of the fact that Group A respondents either by design
or change, are currently not participating in the Government
contracts market. This is an indication that those firms
plan to enter the market if the "Buy Commercial" policy is
adopted. This of course would satisfy one of the main ob-





Analysis of Group 3 Responses
Seventy-five percent of Group B respondents agreed
that the small business community would benefit from the
"Buy Commercial" program, while another 6 8% thought that
their own firm would benefit directly. Forty-six percent
of this group believed that the small business share of the
Government contract market would increase, while only 25%
thought that it would decrease. On the whole, this group

tended to be more optimistic about increasing their own
share of the market than Groups A or C. This difference
in outlook may be attributed to the unique position that
Group B occupies in the Government and commercial contracts
market. They already have the expertise required to obtain
Government contracts, whereas Group A firms do not. Group
B firms also qualify under the "Market Acceptability"
clause, whereas Group C firms do not, therefore Group B
firms have an advantage in flexibility, in that they can
move more freely between the Government and commercial mar-
kets without making major investments or organizational
changes
.
3. Analysis of Group C Responses
Group C respondents tended to maintain the general
pessimistic outlook noted in their previous responses. For
example, 60% thought that the small business community
would not benefit from the "Buy Commercial" program, and
80% indicated that their firm would not benefit directly.
Regarding the issue of market share, 70% thought that small
business share of the Government contract market would be
reduced as a result of the program. Only 10% believed
that an increase would occur.
4
.
Overall Analysis of Responses
Overall, the respondents agreed (64%) that the
small business community would benefit from the "Buy Com-
mercial" program. Another 5 3% thought that their firm
would benefit directly. In regard to market share, 6 8%

thought that small business share of the market would
either remain the same or increase and 72% thought that
their own share of the market would remain the same or in-
crease. With the exception of Group C, the respondents




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In order to fully answer the research questions posed
earlier, it was necessary to review the positions and
opinions of those groups directly involved with the program.
DOD was selected as the representative Government agency
because of the size of their acquisition budget ($99.8
billion during FY 19 78) /~1:4 85_7 and because of the "Buy
Commercial" pilot program (CCAP) which was being conducted
by the Defense Logistics Agency. The opinions of the SBA
and a selected cadre of small businesses were also sampled
in order to determine their perception of the program.
Overall, 6 3% of the small businesses sampled thought that
the "Buy Commercial" program would benefit the small busi-
ness community (Table VII). The major exception to this
general consensus was expressed by those small firms cur-
rently doing more than half their business with the Govern-
ment (Group C respondents). Group C firms were heavily
involved with producing custom built products to Government
specifications. As a result, their perception of the "Buy
Commercial" program tended to be less optimistic than the
outlook of Groups A and B. For example, only 30% of Group
C respondents thought that the small business community
would benefit from the "Buy Commercial" program. Group C
respondents were also more in favor of Federal Government
90

assistance to small businesses than Groups A and B. For
example, 80% of Group C respondents thought that the Govern-
ment should provide some form of special assistance, as com-
pared to 20% for Group A and 40% for Group B (Table VI)
.
Based on the responses obtained it can be concluded that
the Group C firms view the "Buy Commercial" program as a
threat to their existence. The potential elimination of
Government specifications combined with the advent of the
"Market Acceptability" clause has contributed to their under-
lying attitude of pessimism. Those Group C firms that are
unable to compete with the commercially oriented firms may
indeed face a bleak financial future if the "Buy Commercial"
program is applied rigorously throughout the Federal Govern-
ment acquisition process. Sixty percent of all firms re-
sponding thought that the "Market Acceptability" clause would
hurt Group C firms (Table IV) . The Small Business Adminis-
tration expressed similar concern for these firms in a
letter to OFPP /~13_7. Finally, DOD recognized the problem
in a memorandum issued by the Chairman of the "Buy Commer-
cial" Task Group / 17_/. There is agreement then among
government officials and small businesses responding to the
questionnaire that Group C firms will experience some dif-
ficulty. However, the same agreement does not exist in
terms of proposed solutions to the problem. Proposals for
coping with the problem have ranged from imposing a two-year
moratorium on implementation of the program / 18_/, to
providing some form of financial assistance to affected
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firms (suggested by some of the respondents to the question-
naire), to taking no action whatsoever. Which, if any, of
these proposals the Government may select will undoubtedly
depend upon the facts which are presented in support of the
vari ous pos i tions
.
From the Government's point of view, the "Buy Commercial"
program has the potential to meet- all of its desired objec-
tives. As supported by the responses to the questionnaire,
the program will probably result in increased competition
for Government contracts, and lower prices without a major
sacrifice in quality. For these reasons, the program should
be implemented at the earliest possible date. Specific
problems involving Group C firms will emerge as the program
is implemented, but until such time, it will be difficult
to develop a single approach for handling them. A specific
recommendation for coping with this dilemma is contained in
the recommendations to this thesis.
At this point, it is useful to readdress the research
questions which were set forth at the outset of the thesis.
For edification purposes, each question will be repeated and
addressed separately.
1. Will the small business community, as a whole,
benefit from the Government's shift in acquisition policy
from the use of Government specifications and standards to
the "Buy Commercial" concept?
In order to properly address this question, it is
necessary to stratify the small business comm.unity along the
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lines indicated in Chapter III of this thesis. As a whole,
it appears likely that the small business coiranunity will
benefit, in that more small firms will be encouraged to
compete for Government contracts. However, those small
firms that rely on Government contracts for more than half
of their revenue will probably incur financial setbacks as
a result of commercial firms offering off-the-shelf products
at a lower price.
2. If a negative effect will result, what are the
characteristics of such an effect?
As discussed above, those firms that rely on Govern-
ment contracts for more than half of their revenue will be
negatively affected by the program.
3. What modifications to the current "Buy Commercial"
policy could be made in order to enhance accomplishment of
the policy's objectives relative to the small business com-
munity and the Federal Government?
Given that the objectives of the program are to
reduce costs, increase competition and reduce the prolifera-
tion of Government specifications, the "Market Acceptability"
criteria should be reworded so as not to exclude firms which
market products primarily to the Government. To do other-
wise would be to restrict competition. More specific
recommendations for enhancing the "Buy Commercial" policy




1. That the SBA make an effort to identify those small
firms that might suffer major financial setbacks as a result
of the "Buy Commercial" program. The following specific
steps could be taken to make this recommendation a reality.
a. The Small Business Administration or some other
Government agency should develop and maintain a data file
of small businesses doing business with the Federal Govern-
ment. This file should be capable of yielding a listing of
small businesses stratified by industry and percentage of
sales made to the Government during the preceding year. By
accessing this file, SBA or any other interested party or
agency could extract a listing of firms based on the percent-
age of sales made to the Government. Presently, SBA and
other Government agencies are unable to determine the
specific firms and industries which might be negatively
affected by the "Buy Commercial" program, because there is
no existing data base capable of providing that information.
b. The Small Business Administration should solicit
comments from small businesses on the "Buy Commercial"
program by: (1) conducting a survey similar to the survey
contained within this thesis and (2) placing an advertise-
ment in the Commerce Business Daily requesting comments on
the program from small firms.
The rationale for taking the above courses of action
is to be able to establish and project an identifiable small
business constituency within the larger small business
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commiini ty . In the absence of an identifiable constituency,
it is easy for the needs and problems of small groups of
firms to become submerged in the interest of the majority.
This appears to be the case with the "Buy Commercial"
program.
2. That OFPP redefine "Commercial Market Acceptability"
to make it applicable not only to those firms which have
substantial commercial sales, but also to those firms which
have substantial Government sales. It is noted that the
DOD Instruction 5000.37 (Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products) does make such a provision for those
small firms who do not market products to the private sector.
As indicated earlier in this thesis, there is a substantial
number of small firms who have supplied the Government with
products over the years, while neglecting to develop a cadre
of commercial customers. Many of these firms are capable
and competitive, providing they are not eliminated from bid-
ding by the "Market Acceptability" criteria. In order to
emphasize the Goveinment's continued commitment to the small
firms discussed above, the OFPP should address this issue
specifically in an updated version of the 24 May 19 76
Policy Memorandum.
3. As the "Buy Commercial" program is implemented
throughout the Federal Government, the Small Business Set
Aside program should be carefully monitored in order to
ensure that the small business share of government contracts
do not decrease. With the high level emphasis on buying
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more coiranercial products, there is a possibility that con-
tracting activities may emphasize "Buy Commercial" at the
expense of small business set asides. Alertness on the
part of the SBA and small business representatives at con-
tracting activities can play a major role in ensuring that
the Set Aside program remains viable.
4. The Small Business Adminrstration should develop a
contingency plan for providing advisory and financial
assistance to firms which may be negatively impacted by
the "Buy Commercial" program. There is general agreement
between DOD, SBA, OFPP and the small business community
that those small firms which are most dependent on Govern-
ment contracts will be negatively affected by the "Buy Com-
mercial" program. Since the n^amber of potential firms
involved and the extent of the potential damage is unknown,
it would be beneficial to all concerned if the contingency
plan were developed at the earliest practicable date. This
plan could later be modified to cope with whatever specific
problems developed. This approach is an alternative to
SBA ' s recommenation to delay implementation of the "Buy
Commercial" program for two years, because it allows the
Government to immediately reap the benefit of buying com-
mercial products while protecting the interest of those
small businesses negatively impacted by the program. In
an era of ever decreasing buying power, the Government can
ill afford to delay implementing any program which offers
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a potential major cost savings. At the same time however,
long time commitments to the small business community




LT Willie Woods, SC, USN
SMC #10 61
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 39 40
22 December 1978
President or General Manager:
Dear Sir:
I am a student in the Acquisition/Contract Management
Graduate Education program at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. I am presently engaged in a research
project designed to determine the potential impact of the
Federal Government's "Buy Commercial" program on selected
segments of the small business community. I am specifi-
cally interested in this program from a Department of De-
fense perspective. Your firm was selected as a participant
in this study from a government-maintained bidder's list.
Several other firms in your industry were also chosen,
along with firms from other non-related industries. The
results of this study will be distributed to the Small Busi-
ness Administration and Defense Logistics Agency Head-
quarters. The identity of your firm and your responses to
this survey will be held in confidence and no attempts will
be made to identify any individual firms. Your honest and
candid response to questions contained in the survey will




As you may or may not know, the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy issued the following directive to Government
agencies in May 1976: "The Government will purchase com-
mercial off-the-shelf products when such products will
adequately serve the Government's requirements, provided
such products have an established commercial market accept-
ability. The Government will utiJLize commercial distribu-
tion channels in supplying commercial products to its users."
In response to this policy, in late 19 76 the Department of
Defense (DOD) initiated a pilot program designed to determine
the feasibility of implementing the policy on a DOD-wide
basis. This pilot program was dubbed "Commercial Commodity
Acquisition Program" (CCAP) and it is scheduled to terminate
in late 19 78. Under the CCAP program. Federal and military
specifications are to be waived and items are to be procured
utilizing commercial specifications and standards. Your
firm may have already competed for one of these contracts,
in which case you are probably very familiar with the de-
tails of the program.
The enclosed survey is designed to elicit your response
to the program both in terms of your own firm and in terms
of the small business community as a whole. One of the con-
troversial clauses in the "Buy Commercial" program is the
"Market Acceptability Clause", which is quoted below. In
the event that you are not familiar with the program, the
following definition may be used as a basis for your re-
sponse to the pertinent questions on the survey.
99

"Established commercial market acceptability relates to
commercial products that are currently marketed in sub-
stantial quantities for the general public and/or industry.
These marketed items involve commercial sales that predomi-
nate over Government purchases. To have become acceptable
in the market place, products must have been priced competi-
tively and performed acceptably, as judged by a wide range
of users .
"
Upon completion of the enclosed survey, please return it
in the enclosed self addressed/postage paid envelope. The
results of this study will be tabulated and analyzed during
February and March 1979, therefore it is requested that you
complete and return the survey by 30 January 19 79.
If any questions of interpretation arise, please phone





Please respond candidly to each question on this survey.
If there is insufficient space for your response on the
front of this form, please continue responses on the reverse
You may raise and answer any additional questions that you
consider pertinent by attaching an addendum to this survey.
The term "Government" on this survey refers to the "Federal
Government" only. "'
1. Please state whether your firm is a "Small" or "Large"
Business in terms of bidding on Federal Government contracts
(circle the correct response)
.
a. Small business c. Minority Business
b. Large business
2. What are the primary types of products that your firm
sells to the Government (e.g. T-shirts, cotton gloves,
leather gloves, towels, sodium chloride, etc.)
a.
b.
3. Please list your approximate total sales during the







4. What percentage of your total annual sales (approximately)




5. How familiar are you with the Federal Government's "Buy
Commercial" program?
a. Never heard of it prior to this survey
b. I am aware of the program, but I am not familiar
with the details of the program
c. I am very familiar with the program in that I have
read literature on the siibject or received b.riefings on it
d. I have or am currently participating in the program
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6. The following opinions and attitudes have been expressed
about the "Buy Commercial" program. Based on the brief
description in the cover letter or your knowledge of the
program, please indicate the extend to which you agree or
disagree with the following statements (please circle the
appropriate number following each statement)
.








c. The elimination of
Government specifications
will result, in the
Government obtaining
lower prices under this
program
d. I expect that my firm




e. The quality of the
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f. The quality of the products 1 2 3 4 5
that I supply the Govern-
ment will decline if
Government specifications
are eliminated




h. My firms will benefit 1 2 3 4 5
from this program
i. The "Market Acceptability" 1 2 3 4 5
clause will hurt those
small businesses whose
primary customer has been
the Federal Government,
since these firms have
no established place in
the commercial market
7. If the "Buy Commercial" program becomes law, what do you
perceive its impact will be on your share of the Federal
Government contract market (please circle the appropriate
response, and comment on the reason for your response)
a. I expect my share of the market to increase, because:
b. I expect my share of the market to decrease, because
c. I do not expect my share of the market to change,
because:
8. How do you think the "Buy Commercial" program will
10 4

affect t±ie mix of small and large businesses currently ob-
taining Government contracts (please circle the appropriate
response, and comment on the reason for your response)
a. I believe that small businesses will receive a larger
share of the Government market, because:
b. I believe that large businesses will receive a larger
share of the Government market, because:
c. I don't believe that the program will significantly
alter the present mix of small and large businesses obtain-
ing Federal Government contracts, because:
9. In terms of obtaining Government contracts, do you
believe that the "Brand Name or Equal" concept provides an
advantage to (please circle the appropriate response and
comment on the reason for your response)
a. Small business, because:
b. Large business, because:
c. Does not provide an advantage to either
10. In terms of obtaining Government contracts, do you
believe that the "Market Acceptability" clause provides an
advantage to (please circle the appropriate response and
comment on the reason for your response)
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a. Small business, because:
b. Large business, because:
c. Does not provide an advantage to either
11. Do you believe that the Federal Government has an obliga-
tion to provide special consideration or assistance to those
small businesses that might be hurt by the "Market Accept-
ability" clause:
a. No, since I don't believe that the clause will hurt the
small business community.
b. Yes, I believe that the Government does have an obliga-
tion to provide assistance to small businesses (please





1 JULY 1976 1:111
GENERAL PROVISIONS
iUatiom Standard (Nwitb0r
Cod* Induttiy of Empioit»aa)*
MAJOR GROUP 20—FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS
2026 Milk, fluid 500
2032 Canned specialties ,-._ 1000
2043 Cereal breakfast foods 1000
2046 Wet corn milling 750
2052 Cookies and crackers 750
2062 Cane sugar refining 750
2063 Beet sugar 750
2076 Vegetable oil mills, except cottonseed and soybean 1000
2079 Shortening, table oils, margarine and other edible fats and oils, not elM-
where classified . 750
2085 Distilled, rectified, and blended liquors ^ 750
MAJOR GROUP 21—TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS
2111 Cigarettes 1000
MAJOR GROUP 22—TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
2211 Broad woven fabric mills, cotton 1000
2261 Finishers of broad woven fabrics of cotton 1000
2271 Woven carpets and rugs 750
2295 Fabrics, not rubberized 1000
2296 Tire cord and fabric 1000
MAJOR GROUP 28—PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
2611 Pulp miiis 750
2621 Paper mills, except building paper mills 750
2631 Paperboard mills *_ 750
2646 Pressed and molded pulp goods 750
2654 Sanitary food containers 750
2661 Building paper and building board mills 750
MAJOR GROUP 2S—CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
2812 Alkalies and chlorine 1000
2813 Industrial gases 1000
2818 Inorganic pigments 1000
2819 Industrial inorganic chemicals, not elsewhere classified 1000
2821 Plastics materials, synethtic resins, and nonvulcanizable elastomers 750
2822 Synthetic rubber ( vulcanizable elastomers) 1000
2823 Cellulose man-made fibers 1000
2824 Svnthetic organic fibers, except cellulosic 1000
2833 Medicinal chemicals and botanical products 750
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 750
2841 Soap and other detergents, except specialty cleaners 750
2865 Cyclic (coal tar) crudes and cyclic intermediates, dyes, and organic
pigments (lakes and toners) 750
2869 Industrial organic chemicals, not elsewhere classified 1000
2873 Nitrogenous fertilizers 1000
2892 Explosives 750
MAJOR GROUP 29—PETROLEUM REFINING AND
RELATED INDUSTRIES"*
2952 Asphalt felts and coatings 750
MAJOR GROUP 30—RUBBER AND MISCELLANEOUS
PLASTICS PRODUCTS
3011 Tires and innertubes 1000
30111 Passenger car and motorcycle pneumatic tires (casings) *'•••
30112 Truck and bus (and otT-the-road) pneumatic tires**"*
3021 Rubber and plastics footw<?ar 1000
3031 Reclaimed rubber 750
See footnotes at end of list.
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j,^j2 1 JULY 1976
GENERAL PROVISIONS
fleation Standard (Nu-mber
Cods Indtutry of Emplov***)'
MAJOR GROUP 32—STONE, CLAY, GLASS AND CONCRETE PRODUCTS
3211 Flat glass 1000
3221 Glass containers 750
3229 Pressed and blown glass and glassware, not elsewhere classified 750
3241 Cement, hydraulic 750
3261 Vitreous china plumbing fixtures and china and earthenware fittings and
bathroom accessories 750
3275 Gypsum products 1000
3292 Asbestos products 750
3296 Mineral wool 750
3297 Nonclay refractories 750
MAJOR GROUP 33—PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
3312 Blast furnaces (including coke ovens), steel works, and rolling mills 1000
3313 Electrometallurgical products 750
3315 Steel wire drawing and steel nails and spikes 1000
3316 Cold roiled sheet, strip and bars 1000
3317 Steel pipe and tubes 1000
3331 Primary smelting and refining of copper 1000
3332 Primary smelting and refining of lead 1000
3333 Primary smelting and refining of zinc 750
3334 Primary production of aluminum 1000
3339 Primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals, not elsewhere
classified 750
3351 Rolling, drawing, and extruding of copper 750
3353 Aluminum sheet, plate and foil 750
3354 Aluminum extruded products 750
3355 Aluminum rolling and drawing, not elsewhere classified 730
3356 Rolling, drawing, and extruding of nonferrous metals, except copper and
aluminum 750
3357 Drawing and insulating of nonferrous wire 1000
3398 Metal heat treating 750
3399 Primary metal industries, not elsewhere classified 750
MAJOR GROUP 34—FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS. EXCEPT
MACHINERY AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
3411 Metal cans 1000
3431 Enameled iron and metal sanitary ware 750
3482 Small arms ammunition 1000
3483 Ammunition except for small arms, not elsewhere classified 1500
3484 Small arms 1000
MAJOR GROUP 35—MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
3511 Steam, gas, and hydraulic turbines; and turbine-generator set units _. 1000
3519 Internal combustion engines, not elsewhere classified 1000
3531 Construction machinery and equipment 750
3537 Industrial trucks, tractors, trailers and stackers 750
3562 Ball and roller bearings 750
3572 Typewriters 1000
3573 Electronic computing equipment 1000
3574 Calculating and accounting machines, except electronic computing equip-
ment 1000
3585 Air conditioning and warm air heating equipment and commercial and
industrial refrigeration equipment 750
See footnotes at end of list.
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1 JULY 1976 1:113
GENERAL PROVISIONS
jication Standard (Nutiiinr
Codt Indtutrr of SmpUnffi*
MAJOR GROUP 36—ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES
3612 Power, distribution, and specialty tranafonners 750
3613 Switchgear and switchboard apparatus 750
3621 Motors and generators 1000
3622 Industrial controls 750
3624 Carbon and graphite products 750
3631 Household cooking equipment , 750
3632 Household refrigerators and home and farm freetera 1000
3633 Household laundry equipment 1000
3634 Electric housewares and fans 750
3635 Household vacuum cleaners 750
3636 Sewing machines 750
3641 Electric lamps 1000
3651 Radio and television receiving sets, except communication types 750
3652 Phonograph records and prerecorded magnetic tapes 750
3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 1000
3662 Radio anc^ television transmitting, signaling, and detection equipment and
apparatus* •••• 750
3671 Raciio and television receiving type electron tubes, except cathode ray __ _ 1000
3672 Cathode ray television picture tubes 750
3673 Transmitting, industrial, and special purpose electron tubes 750
3692 Primary batteries, dry and wet 1000
3694 Electrical equipment for internal combustion engines 750
MAJOR GROUP 37—TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
3711 Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies 1000
37111 Passenger cars (knocked down or assembled) •*•*
3721 Aircraft*****" 1500
3724 .Aircraft engine* and engine parts****** 1000
3728 Aircraft parts and auxiliary equipment, not elsewhere classified 1000
3731 Shipbuilding and repairing »»«•••• 1000
3743 Railroad equipment 1000
3761 Guided missiles and space vehicles 1000
3764 Guided missiles and space vehicle propulsion units and propulsion unit
parts 1000
3769 Guided missile and space vehicle parts and auxiliary equipment, not else-
where classified 1000
3795 Tanks and tank components 1000
MAJOR GROUP 39—MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
3996 Linoleum, asphalted-felt-base, and other hard surface floor coverings, not
elsewhere classified 750
[See footnotes on following page.]
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1:114 1 JULY 1976
GENERAL PROVISIONS
FOOTNOTES FOR PRECEDING LIST
• The "number of employee!" means the average employment of
any concern and us affiliates based on the number of persons cm-
ployed during the pay period ending nearest the last day of the third
month m each calendar quarter tor the preceding four quarters.
•• Reserved.
••• The sue standard for SIC :9I I :s set forth in I-70I 1(2)62.
•••• The size standard for SIC 301 I 1 , 301 12. ind 37 111 are set
forth in 1-701. 1(2)*J i/u/ 4.
*•••* Guided missiie engines and engine parts are classified in SIC
3764 and 3724. Missile control systems are ciaisit'ied in SIC 3662.
••*••• Includes maintenance as del'ined in the federal Aviation
Regulations ( 14 CFR II) but excludes contracts solely tor preventive
maintenance as Jerined in 14 CFR I I
.
As Jcfined <n ;he Federal
Aviation Regulations: ' ' Mainienance' means inspection, overhaul,
repair, preservation, and the replacement j( parts, but excludes
preventive maintenance. " 'Preventive mtunienarxce' means simple or
minor preservation operations and the replacement o( small standard
parts not involving complex assembly operations."
•***••• Shipnuiiding and repairing mdustry includes establish-
ments primanly :ngaged 'n building and repainng all types o< ships,
barges, canal boats, and liqhters. of 5 ^ross tons and over, whether
propelled by sail or motor power or towed by other craft, f^stablish-
menls primarily engaged in fabrication or repairing structural assem-
blies or components tor ships, or iubcontractors engaged m ship
painting, joinery, carpentry worn, electrical wiring inslulldlion, etc..
are not included. The size standard for Boatbuilding and Repairing
(establishments primarily engaged in building and repairing all types
of boats, except .-ubber boats, under 5 gross tons) is 500.
1-701.4




1. The Budget of the United States Government—Fiscal Year
19 79 , U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
2. Report of the Commission on Government Procurement,
Volume 3, Acquisition of Commercial Products , December
1972.
3. Defense Acquisition Regulations (-formerly Armed Services
Procurement Regulations)
,
19 76- Edition , Department of
Defense, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
4. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Unclassified Memo-
randum to Department of Defense, Veterans Administra-
tion and General Services Administration, Subject:
Procurement and Supply of Commercial Products , 2 4 May
19 76.
5. General Accounting Office, Report PSAD-77-171, Govern-
ment Specifications for Commercial Products—Necessary
or a Wasted Effort? 3 November 19 77.
6. Department of Defense Science Board Report, Use of Off-
The-Shelf Electronic Test Equipment to Reduce Costs
,
Shorten Leadtimes, Assure Reliability, and Simplify
Logistics , by the Task Force on Electronic Test Equip-
ment, February 19 75.
7. Department of Defense Science Board Report on Specifica-
tions and Standards , by the Task Force on Specifications
and Standards, April 19 77.
8. Deadmon, C. M. and Peck, J. M. , An Analysis of Selected
Factors for Determination of Small Business Eligibility
for Air Force Procurement , M. S. Thesis, U. S. Air
Force Institute of Technology Air University, February
1971.
9. Air War College Report 610 6, The 8(a) Program - A Boon
or Bust for the Minority Small Business Firm , by
H. M. Whitmer, April 19 76.
10. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, Federal Acquisition Act of 1977 (S-1264)
,
Committee Report , House of Senate, 95th 'Cong., 1st
Session, September 21, 1977.
Ill

11. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and
Logistics Unclassified Memorandum to Service Secre-
taries, Subject; Application of Commercial Commodities
to Defense Requirements
,
30 December 19 75.
12. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and
Logistics and Deputy Director Defense Research and
Engineering Unclassified Memorandum to Service Secre-
taries, Subject: Commercial Commodity Acquisition
Program
, 14 January 19 77.
13. Attachment to Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Unclassified Memorandum to Department of Defense,
General Services Administration and Veterans Adminis-
tration, Subject: Incremental Implementation of Policy
on Procurement and Supply of Commercial Products
Planning and Analysis Phase, Items Selected for
Analysis
,
6 December 19 76.
14. Jasper Glove Company, Inc. Letter to Defense Personnel
Support Center, Subject: Protest of Award of Contract
for Work Gloves , 8 September 1978.
15. Supreme Manufacturing Company Letter to Defense Person-
nel Support Center, Subject: Award of Contract for
Non-Specification Undershirts , 16 August 19 78.
16. Small Business Administration Unclassified Letter to
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Subject: SBA
Comments on the Acquisition and Distribution of
Commercial Products
,
5 July 19 78.
17. Attachment 4 to Chairman ADCP Task Group Unclassfied
Memorandum to ADCP Task Group Members, Subject: Ac-
quisition and Distribution of Commercial Products and
the Small Business or Labor Surplus Area Set Aside'
Program
, 12 October 19 78.
18. Small Business Administration Unclassified Letter to
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Subject: Impact
of the Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial
Products on Small Business , 6 October 19 78.
19. Enclosure (2) to Defense Personnel Support Center Un-
classified Letter to Defense Logistics Agency, Sub-
ject: Report on CCAP Pilot Test Items - Gloves, Rubber
,
Electrical Workers and Gloves, Cloth Men's Work
,
20 October 19 78.
20. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.37, Subject:
Acquisition and Distribution of Commercial Products
,





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 014 2 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 39 40
3. Department Chairman, Code 5 4 I
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 39 40
4. Asst. Professor D. V. Lamm, Code 54Lt 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 39 40
5. Small Business Administration L
Washington, D.C. 20416
6. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange i
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
7. LT Willie ,E . Woods 1
Code 11
U.S. Naval Ordnance Station









The potent- iai •
of tUc ^"^'3' impactO the government's
Buy commercial" nnf








c.l The potential Impact
of the government's
"Buy commercial" poli-
cy on small business.
thesW84357
The potential impact of the government's
3 2768 001 90621 7
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
